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Abstract
We investigate the effects of the social interactions of a finite set of agents on an equilibrium
pricing mechanism. A derivative written on non-tradable underlyings is introduced to the market
and priced in an equilibrium framework by agents who assess risk using convex dynamic risk
measures expressed by Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDE). Each agent is not
only exposed to financial and non-financial risk factors, but she also faces performance concerns
with respect to the other agents.
Within our proposed model we prove the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium whose
analysis involves systems of fully coupled multi-dimensional quadratic BSDEs. We extend the
theory of the representative agent by showing that a non-standard aggregation of risk measures
is possible via weighted-dilated infimal convolution. We analyze the impact of the problem’s
parameters on the pricing mechanism, in particular how the agents’ performance concern rates
affect prices and risk perceptions. In extreme situations, we find that the concern rates destroy
the equilibrium while the risk measures themselves remain stable.
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1 Introduction
The importance of relative concerns in human behavior has been emphasized both in economic
and sociological studies; making a 1 EUR profit when everyone else made 2 EUR “feels” distinctly
different had everyone else lost 2 EUR. A diverse literature handling problems dealing with some
form of strategic and/or social interaction in the form of relative performance concerns exists: In
both [HRAY10] and [Ped13] the social interaction component appears in the form of peer-based
under-performance penalties known as “Minimum Return Guarantees”; the comparison is usually
done via tracking a relevant market index, something quite standard in pension fund management.
Another type of performance concerns arises in problems where the agents’ consumption is taken
into account. The utility functions used there exhibit a “keeping up with the Joneses” behavior as
introduced in [Due49] and developed by [Abe90], [Abe99] (see further [Gal94], [CK01], [Góm07]
and [XZ09]); in other words, the benchmark for the standard of living is the averaged consump-
tion of the population and one computes the individual’s consumption preferences in relation to
that benchmark. Another type of concern criterion, an internal one, uses the past consumption of
the agent as a benchmark for the current consumption; [JH73] introduced this “habit formation”
approach. A more mathematical finance approach, as well as a literature overview, can be found in
[ET15] or [FDR11]. These last two papers are the inspiration for this one.
In this paper we study the effects of social interaction between economic agents on a market
equilibrium, the efficiency of a securitization mechanism and the global risk. We consider a finite set
A of N agents having access to an incomplete market consisting of an exogenously priced liquidly
traded financial asset. The incompleteness stems from a non-tradable external risk factor, such as
the amount of rain or the temperature, to which those agents are exposed. In an attempt to reduce
the individual and overall market risks, a social planner introduces to the market a derivative writ-
ten on the external risk source, allowing the agents in A to reduce their exposures by trading on it.
The question of the actual completeness of the resulting market has been addressed in some gener-
ality in the literature, and we refer for instance to [Sch15]. Questions about pricing and benefits of
such securities written on non-tradable assets have been approached in the literature many times,
we refer in particular to [HPDR10] where the new derivative is priced within an equilibrium frame-
work according to supply and demand rules and more generally to [AR08]. Equilibrium analysis
of incomplete markets is commonly confined to certain cases such as single agent models ([HL93],
[GPP09]), multiple agent models where markets are complete in equilibrium ([DH85], [HPDR10],
[KLS90]), or models with particular classes of goods ([JRW10]) or preferences ([CFHP10]). For
a good overview of equilibrium issues stemming the from market incompleteness as well as some
solutions we point the reader to [KXŽ15] and references therein.
Although we follow ideas similar to those in [HPDR10], our goal is to understand how such a
pricing mechanism and risk assessments are affected when the agents have relative performance
concerns with respect to each other. Each agent a ∈ A has an endowment Ha over the time period
[0, T ] depending on both risk factors. Her investment strategy πa in stock and the newly introduced
derivative induces a gains process (V at (π
a))t∈[0,T ]. For a given performance concern rate λa ∈ [0, 1]
the agent seeks to minimize the risk
ρa
(
Ha +
(
1− λa
)
V aT (π
a) + λa
(
V aT (π
a)−
1
N − 1
∑
b∈A\{a}
V bT (π
b)
))
, (1.1)
where ρa is a risk measure (ρa is further described below). The first two terms inside ρa correspond
to the classical situation of an isolated agent a trading optimally in the market to profit from market
movements and to hedge the financial risks inherent to Ha. The last term is the relative performance
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concern and corresponds to the difference between her own trading gains and the average trading
gains achieved by her peers. Intuitively, as λa ∈ [0, 1] increases, the agent is less concerned with the
risks associated to her endowment Ha and more concerned with how she fares against the average
performance of the other agents in A. For instance, given no endowments, if λa = 1/2 and agent a
made 1 EUR from trading while the others all made 2 EUR then she perceives no gain at all.
Each agent a ∈ A uses a monetary convex risk measure ρa. The theory of monetary, possibly
convex, possibly coherent, risk measures was initiated by [ADEH99] and later extended by [FS02]
and [FRG02]. One special class of risk measures, the so-called g-conditional risk measures, which are
closely related to the so-called g-conditional expectations (see [Gia06]), are those defined through
Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs), see [Pen97], [ER09] and [BE09]. Our use of
BSDEs is motivated by two general aspects. The first is that it generically allows to solve stochastic
control problems away from the usual Markovian setup where one uses the HJB approach in com-
bination with PDE theory, see e.g. [Tou13]. The second is that optimization can be carried out in
closed sets of constraints without the assumption of convexity for which one usually uses duality
theory, see [HIM05].
The form of relative performance concern we use and its study using BSDEs can be traced back
to [Esp10] and [ET15]. Their setting is quite different from that presented here; the authors show
the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a pure-interaction game of optimal investment without id-
iosyncratic endowments to hedge (Ha = 0 for all agents), and where the agents optimize, in a
Black–Scholes stock market, the expected utility of the gains they make from trading under indi-
vidual constraints. These two works are followed by [FDR11], where a general discussion on the
existence of equilibrium, with endowments, is given including counter examples to such existence.
Methodology and content of the paper. All agents optimize their respective functional given by
(1.1) and, as the derivative is priced endogenously via an equilibrium framework, the market price
of external risk is also part of the problem’s solution. Equilibrium in our game is a set of investment
strategies and a market price of external risk giving rise to a certain martingale measure.
In the first part of this work, we show the existence of the Nash equilibrium in our problem
and how to compute it for general risk measures induced by BSDEs. The analysis is carried out in
two steps. The first involves solving the individual optimization problem for each agent given the
other agents’ actions, the so-called best response problem. The second consists in showing that it
is possible to find all best responses simultaneously in such a way that supply and demand for the
derivative match, which, in turn, yields the market price of external risk. (We generally think of
a market with a zero net supply of the derivative; however, the methodology allows to treat cases
where some agents who were allowed to trade in the derivative left the market such that the (active)
agents in A hold together a non-zero position). We then verify that the market price of external risk
associated to the best responses satisfies the necessary conditions.
This last step is more complex. Since the agents assess their risks using dynamic risk measures
given by BSDEs, the general equilibrium analysis leads to a system of fully coupled non-linear
multi-dimensional BSDEs (possibly quadratic). We proceed by extending the representative agent
approach (see [Neg60]) where aggregation of the agents into a single economy and optimal Pareto
risk sharing are equivalent to simultaneous individual optimization. From the works of [BE05]
and [BE09], we extend their infimal convolution (short inf-convolution) technique to agents with
interdependent utility functions. This approach yields a single risk measure that encompasses the
risk preferences for each agent and through which it is possible to find a single representative
economy. We point out that in order to cope with the cross dependence induced by the performance
concern rates, standard inf-convolution techniques do not lead to a single representative economy.
We use the technique in a non-standard fashion via weighted-dilations of each agent’s risk measure
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ρa (see Section 3.2 in [BE09] and Section 4 below); to the best of our knowledge this type of
analysis is new and of independent interest. The closest reference to this is [Rüs13], where some
form of weighted inf-convolution appears.
The second part of this work focuses on the case of agents using entropic risk measures, which
can be treated more explicitly and allows for an in-depth study of the impact of the concern rates.
In identifying the Nash equilibrium, we are led to a system of fully coupled multi-dimensional
quadratic BSDEs whose analysis is, in general, quite involved. Based on the works of [Esp10]
and [ET15], the authors of [FDR11] give several counter examples to the existence of solutions;
nonetheless, positive results do exist although none are very general, see e.g. [Tev08], [CN15],
[Fre14], [KP16], [HT16], [XŽ16], [JKL14] and [LT15]. In our case we are able to solve the system.
Findings. Within the case of entropic risk measures, we study in detail a model of two agents
a and b with opposite exposures to the external risk factor, so that one has incentives to buy the
derivative while the other has incentive to sell. In this model we are able to specify the structure of
the equilibrium. Using both analytical methods and numerical computations, when the analytics are
not tractable, we explore the behavior of the agents as the model parameters vary. We give particular
attention to how the relative performance concern rates, and thereby the strength of the coupling
between the agents, deviate from the standard case of non-interacting agents (when λa = λb = 0).
We find that as either agent’s risk tolerance increases, their risk lowers. If any concern rate λ
increases then the agents engage in less trading of the derivative. This is because every unit of
derivative bought by one is a unit sold by the other and hence the gains of one are the losses of the
other. Consequently, if an agent is more concerned about the relative performance, she will tend
to trade less with the others. Also, as expected, we find that if it is the buyer of derivatives whose
concern rate increases, the derivative’s price decreases, while it increases in the case of the seller.
Very interestingly, we find that the risk of a single agent increases if the other agents become
more concerned with their relative performance but that it decreases as this agent becomes more
concerned. Consequently, if the agents were to play this game repeatedly and their concern rate
were to vary over time, they would both find it more advantageous to become more concerned (or
jealous). As they both do so, the trading activity in the derivative decreases, but their activity in the
stock increases and explodes - the equilibrium does not exist anymore. Surprisingly, this behavior
is not captured at all by the risk measures! This non-trivial, and perhaps not desirable, behavior of
the system after introduction of the derivative is not without similarities with what is found in the
models of [CMV09] and [CML13]. It is a reminder that, when evaluating the benefits of financial
innovation, one should not focus of the economy of an individual agent (who sees clear benefits in
the form of a risk reduction) but really have a systemic view of the impact of the new instrument.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we define the general market, agents, optimization
problem and equilibrium that we consider. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to solving the general
optimization problem for a set of agents having arbitrary risk measures. In the former we solve the
optimization problem for each agent, given the strategies of all others. In the latter we deal with
the aggregation of individual risk measures and identification of the representative agent, and we
solves the equilibrium for the whole system. Sections 5 and 6 contain the particular case where the
agents use entropic risk measures. In this more tractable setting, Section 5 explores theoretically
the influence of various parameters on the global risk while Section 6 focuses on a model with 2
agents with opposite risk profiles, and thoroughly explores the influence of the concern rates, in
particular, on the individual behaviors, risks, and the consequences for the whole system. We also
present numerical results. Section 7 concludes the study.
Acknowledgments. The authors would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their to-
the-point and informative reports that have allowed us to improve several aspects of this work.
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2 The model
We consider a finite set A ofN agents, without loss of generality A = {1, 2, . . . , N}, with random
endowments Ha, a ∈ A, to be received at a terminal time T < ∞. They trade continuously in
the financial market which comprises a stock and a newly introduced structured security (called
derivative), aiming to minimize their risk. For simplicity we assume that money can be lent or
borrowed at the risk-free rate zero. Stock prices follow an exogenous diffusion process and are not
affected by the agents’ demand. By contrast, the derivative is traded only by the agents from A and
priced endogenously such that demand matches supply. We point the reader to Appendix A for a full
overview of the notation and stochastic setup.
2.1 The market
Sources of risk and underlyings
Throughout this paper t ∈ [0, T ]. In our model, there are two independent sources of random-
ness, represented by a 2-dimensional standard Brownian motion W = (W S ,WR) on a standard
filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)Tt=0,P), where (Ft) is the filtration generated byW and augmented
by the P-null sets. The Brownian motionWR drives the external and non-tradable risk process (Rt),
which is thought of as a temperature process or a precipitation index. For analytical convenience we
assume that (Rt) follows a Brownian motion with drift being a stochastic process µR : Ω×[0, T ]→ R
and constant volatility b > 0, i.e.,
dRt = µ
R
t dt+ bdW
R
t , with R0 = r0 ∈ R. (2.1)
The Brownian motionW S drives the stock price process (St) according to
dSt = µ
S
t St dt+ σ
S
t St dW
S
t , (2.2)
= µSt St dt+ 〈σt,dWt〉 with σt := (σ
S
t St, 0) ∈ R
2, and S0 = s0 > 0.
We assume throughout this work that the stochastic processes µR, µS , σS : Ω × [0, T ] → R are
(Ft)-adapted, with σS > 0.
Market price of risk: financial and external
We recall (see e.g. [HM07]) that any linear pricing scheme on the set L2(P) of square integrable
random variables with respect to P can be identified with a 2-dimensional predictable process θ
such that the exponential process (Eθt ) defined by
Eθt := E
(
−
∫ ·
0
〈θs,dWs〉
)
t
= exp
{
−
∫ t
0
〈θs,dWs〉 −
1
2
∫ t
0
|θs|
2ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.3)
is a uniformly integrable martingale. This ensures that the measure Pθ defined by having density EθT
against P is indeed a probability measure (the pricing measure), and the present price of a random
terminal payment X is then given by Eθ[X], where Eθ denotes the expectation with respect to Pθ.
For any such θ, we introduce the Pθ-Brownian motion
W θt = Wt +
∫ t
0
θs ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
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The first component θS of the vector θ := (θS , θR) is the market price of financial risk. Under the
assumption that there is no arbitrage, S must be a martingale under Pθ and, from the exogenously
given dynamics of S, θS is necessarily given by θSt = µ
S
t /σ
S
t . The process θ
R on the other hand is
unknown. It is the market price of external risk and will be derived endogenously by the market
clearing condition (or constant net supply condition, see below).
The agents’ endowments and the derivative’s payoffs
The agents a ∈ A receive at time T the income Ha which depends on the financial and external
risk factors. While the agents are able to trade in the financial market to hedge away some of
their financial risk, a basis risk remains originating in the agent’s exposure to the non-tradable risk
process R. A derivative with payoff HD at maturity time T is externally introduced in the market.
By trading in the derivative HD, the agents have now a way to reduce their basis risk.
We give general conditions on the endowments, derivative payoff and coefficients appearing
in the dynamics of S and R (see Appendix A for notation). Throughout the rest of this work the
following assumption stands for all results.
Assumption 2.1 (Standing assumption on the data of the problem). The processes µR, µS, σS and
θS := µS/σS are bounded (belong to S∞). The random variables HD and Ha, a ∈ A, are bounded
(belong to L∞(FT )).
Price of the derivative, trading in the market and the agent’s strategies
Assuming no arbitrage opportunities, the price process (Bθt ) of H
D is given by its expected
payoff under Pθ; in other words Bθ· = E
θ
[
HD|F·
]
. Since HD is bounded, writing the Pθ-martingale
as a stochastic integral against the Pθ-Brownian motion W θ (with the martingale representation
theorem) yields a 2-dimensional square-integrable adapted process κθ := (κS , κR) such that for
t ∈ [0, T ]
Bθt = E
θ[HD] +
∫ t
0
〈κθs,dW
θ
s 〉 = E
θ[HD] +
∫ t
0
〈κθs,dWs〉+
∫ t
0
〈
κθs, θs
〉
ds. (2.4)
Note that we have (B,κ) ∈ S∞ ×HBMO(Pθ). We denote by π
a,1
t and π
a,2
t the number of units agent
a ∈ A holds in the stock and the derivative at time t ∈ [0, T ], respectively. Using a self-financing
strategy πa := (πa,1, πa,2) valued in R2, her gains from trading up to time t ∈ [0, T ], under the
pricing measure Pθ inducing the prices (Bθt ) for the derivative, are given by
V at = Vt(π
a) =
∫ t
0
πa,1s dSs +
∫ t
0
πa,2s dB
θ
s
=
∫ t
0
〈
πa,1s σs + π
a,2
s κ
θ
s, θs
〉
ds+
∫ t
0
〈πa,1s σs + π
a,2
s κ
θ
s,dWs〉.
We require that the trading strategies be integrable against the prices, πa ∈ L2
(
(S,Bθ),Pθ
)
(i.e.
Eθ [〈 V·(π
a) 〉T ] <∞), so that the gains process are square-integrable martingales under P
θ.
2.2 Preferences, risk minimization and equilibrium
The agents’ measure of risk
The agents assess their risk using a dynamic convex time-consistent risk measure ρa· induced by
a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE). This means that the risk ρat (ξ
a) which agent
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a ∈ A associates at time t ∈ [0, T ] with an FT -measurable random position ξa is given by Y at , where
(Y a, Za) is the solution to the BSDE
−dY at = g
a(t, Zat )dt− 〈Z
a
t ,dWt〉 with terminal condition Y
a
T = −ξ
a.
The driver ga encodes the risk preferences of the agent. We assume that ga has the following prop-
erties:
Assumption 2.2. The map ga : [0, T ]×R2 → R is a deterministic continuous function. Its restriction to
the space variable, z 7→ ga(·, z), is continuously differentiable, strictly convex and attains its minimum.
For any fixed (t, ϑ) ∈ [0, T ]×R2, the map z 7→ ga(t, z)− 〈z, ϑ〉 is also strictly convex and attains
its unique minimum at the point where its gradient vanishes. With this in mind we can define
Za : [0, T ] × R2 → R2, (t, ϑ) 7→ Za(t, ϑ) where Za(t, ϑ) is the unique solution, in the unknown Z,
to the equation
∇zg
a(t,Z) = ϑ. (2.5)
The agents’ risk measure given by the above BSDE is strongly time consistent, convex and trans-
lation invariant (or monetary). We do not give many details on the class of risk measures described
by BSDEs, instead, we point the interested reader to [BE05,Gia06,BE09].
For convenience, we recall the relevant properties of the risk measures that play a role in this
work: i) translation invariance: for anym ∈ R and any t ∈ [0, T ] it holds that ρat (ξ
a+m) = ρat (ξ
a)−m;
ii) time-consistency of the process
(
ρat (ξ
a)
)
: for any t, t+s ∈ [0, T ] it holds that ρat (ξ
a) = ρat (ρ
a
t+s(ξ
a));
and iii) convexity: for any t ∈ [0, T ] and for ξa, ξˆa FT -measurable and α ∈ [0, 1] we have ρat
(
αξa +
(1− α)ξˆa
)
≤ αρat (ξ
a) + (1− α)ρat (ξˆ
a).
The individual optimization problem
Agent a’s position ξa at maturity is given by the sum of her terminal income Ha and the trading
gains V aT over the time period [0, T ]. However, the agent compares her trading gains V
a
T = VT (π
a)
with the average gains of all other agents. Thus, we define the perceived total wealth ξa(πa, π−a) of
each of the N agents a ∈ A in the market at time t = T as
ξa =
(
Ha +
(
1− λa
)
VT (π
a)
)
+ λa
(
VT (π
a)−
1
N − 1
∑
b∈A\{a}
VT (π
b)
)
= Ha + VT (π
a)− λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
VT (π
b), where λ˜a :=
λa
N − 1
and λa ∈ [0, 1] is the concern rate (or jealousy factor) of agent a ∈ A (compare with (1.1)).
We make the following assumption on the concern rates λ·, whose justification will become clear
later on in Section 3.3.5.
Assumption 2.3 (Performance concern rates1). We have λa ∈ [0, 1] for each agent and
∏
a∈A λ
a < 1.
1The case of λa > 1 is, as we show in Section 3.3.5, not necessarily intractable, but the analysis of such a situation is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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For notational convenience we introduce the
(
R2
)(N−1)-valued vector π−a := (πb)b6=a and
V¯ −at :=
∑
b∈A\{a}
Vt(π
b) = Vt(π¯
−a) where π¯−a :=
∑
b∈A\{a}
πb. (2.6)
The risk associated with the self-financing strategy πa evolves according to the BSDE
−dY at = g
a (t, Zat ) dt− 〈Z
a
t ,dWt〉 and Y
a
T = −ξ
a(πa, π−a) = −
(
Ha + VT (π
a)− λ˜aVT (π¯
−a)
)
.
(2.7)
Now, we introduce a notion of admissibility for our problem.
Definition 2.4 (Admissibility). Let a ∈ A, and π−a = (πb)b∈A\{a} be integrable strategies for the other
agents. The R2-valued strategy process πa is called admissible with respect to the market price of risk
θ if Eθ [〈 V·(π
a) 〉T ] < ∞, where 〈V·(π
a)〉 denotes the quadratic variation of
(
Vt(π
a)
)
t∈[0,T ]
and BSDE
(2.7) has a unique solution. The set of admissible trading strategies for agent a ∈ A is denoted by
Aθ(π−a).
We point out that in full generality each agent could have her own trading constraints, as in
[ET15] or [FDR11]. Here we assume that the agents have no trading constraints, aside from their
strategies being integrable against the prices and leading to well-defined risk.
Each agent a ∈ A solves the following risk-minimization problem
min{Y a0 (π
a, π−a) | πa ∈ Aθ(π−a)}.
Notice that, a priori, the risk for agent a and the strategy chosen depend on the strategies of all
other players, π−a. This interdependence is an ever-present feature of our model. For the sake of
presentation we leave it implicit whenever possible and we write the solution to the BSDE giving
the risk for Agent a as (Y a, Za) instead of
(
Y a(πa, π−a), Za(πa, π−a)
)
. We will use the latter when
the situation requires it.
Competitive equilibrium, equilibrium market price of risk and endogenous trading
We denote by n ∈ R the number of units of derivative present in the market. While each unit of
derivative pays HD at time T , the agents are free to buy and underwrite contracts for any amount
of HD, so that n is not necessarily an integer. We think essentially of the case n = 0, where every
derivative held by an agent has been underwritten by another agent in A, entailing essentially that
agents share their risks with each other (see [BE05, BE09] or [HM07]). Building upon [HPDR10]
allows for a bit more flexibility as n 6= 0 is possible2. In any case, over [0, T ], only the agents in our
set A, with trading objectives as described above, are active in the market and so the total number
n of derivatives present is constant over time.
We assume that each agent seeks to minimize her risk measure independently, without cooper-
ation with the other agents, so we are interested in Nash equilibria.
Definition 2.5 (Equilibrium and equilibrium MPR (EMPR)). For a givenMarket Price of Risk (MPR)
θ = (θS, θR), we call π∗ = (π∗,a)a∈A an equilibrium if, for all a ∈ A , π
∗,a ∈ Aθ(π∗,−a) and
2The situation n 6= 0 would be possible if, prior to time t = 0, another agent a0 /∈ A was on the derivatives market and
then stopped her activity, for instance a0 might have had as objective to buy m > 0 units, according to her own specific
criteria, in which case n = −m < 0.
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for any admissible strategy πa it holds that Y a0 (π
∗,a, π∗,−a) ≤ Y a0 (π
a, π∗,−a),
i.e. individual optimality given the strategies of the other agents. We call θ Equilibrium MPR (EMPR)
and θR Equilibrium Market Price of external Risk (EMPeR) if
1. θ = (θS , θR) makes Pθ a true probability measure (equivalently, Eθ from (2.3) is a uniformly
integrable martingale);
2. there exists a unique equilibrium π∗ for θ;
3. π∗ satisfies the market clearing condition (or fixed supply condition) for the derivativeHD (where
Leb denotes the Lebesgue measure):∑
a∈A
π∗,a,2t =
∑
a∈A
π∗,a,20 = n P⊗ Leb− a.e. (2.8)
3 The single agent’s optimization and unconstrained equilibrium
In this section and the one following, we study the solvability of the problem and the structure of
the equilibrium for general risk measures induced by a BSDE. Finding an equilibrium market price
of external risk is, essentially, an optimization under the fixed-supply constraint. So, prior to looking
whether such an equilibrium MPR exists (postponed to Section 4), we start by fixing an arbitrary
MPR θ ∈ HBMO and solve for the behavior of the system of agents given that MPR, without the
fixed-supply constraint. For this, we first solve for the behavior of the individual agents given that
the others have chosen their strategies (the so-called best response problem), and then solve for the
Nash equilibrium for the system of agents.
3.1 Optimal response for one agent
In this subsection, in addition to a MPR θ being fixed, we assume given the strategies π−a =
(πb)b∈A\{a} of the other agents, for a fixed agent a ∈ A, and we study the investment problem for a
single agent whose preferences are encoded by ga.
Optimizing the residual risk
To solve the optimization problem for agent a, we first recall from [HPDR10] that, at each time
t ∈ [0, T ], the strategy chosen must minimize the residual risk: the additivity of the risk measure
implies (writing VT = (VT − Vt) + Vt and using the translation invariance) that
Y at = ρ
a
t
(
Ha + V aT − λ˜
aV¯ −aT
)
= ρat
(
Ha + (V aT − V
a
t )− λ˜
a(V¯ −aT − V¯
−a
t )
)
−
(
V at − λ˜
aV¯ −at
)
.
This suggests applying the following change of variables to (2.7) (using (2.6)),
Y˜ at := Y
a
t +
(
V at − λ˜
aV¯ −at
)
,
Z˜at := Z
a
t + ζ
a
t , where ζ
a
t =
(
πa,1t σt + π
a,2
t κ
θ
t
)
− λ˜a
(
π¯−a,1t σt + π¯
−a,2
t κ
θ
t
)
∈ R2.
(3.1)
If the strategies are not clear from the context, we also write ζa = ζa(π) = ζa(πa, π−a). Direct
computations yield a BSDE for (Y˜ a, Z˜a) given by
−dY˜ at = g˜
a
(
t, πat , π
−a
t , Z˜
a
t
)
dt− 〈Z˜at ,dWt〉 with terminal condition Y˜
a
T = −H
a, (3.2)
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where the driver g˜a : Ω× [0, T ]× R2 × (R2)N−1 × R2 → R is defined as
g˜a(t, πat , π
−a
t , z
a) : = ga
(
t, za − ζat
)
− 〈ζat , θt〉 (3.3)
= ga
(
t, za −
((
πa,1t − λ˜
aπ¯−a,1t
)
σt +
(
πa,2t − λ˜
aπ¯−a,2t
)
κθt
))
(3.4)
−
〈(
πa,1t − λ˜
aπ¯−a,1t
)
σt +
(
πa,2t − λ˜
aπ¯−a,2t
)
κθt , θt
〉
.
Each individual agent a ∈ A seeks to minimize Y˜ a0 , the solution to (3.2), via her choice of investment
strategy πa ∈ Aθ(π−a), in other words she aims at solving
min
pia∈Aθ(pi−a)
Y˜ a0 (π
a, π−a). (3.5)
Before we solve the individual optimization, we assume that the derivative HD does indeed com-
plete the market. This must then be verified a posteriori (once the solution is computed) and case-
by-case depending on the specific model.
Assumption 3.1. Assume that κRt 6= 0, for any t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. .
The pointwise minimizer for the single agent’s residual risk
In (3.2), the strategy πa appears only in the driver g˜a. The comparison theorem for BSDEs
suggests that in order to minimize Y˜ a0 (π
a) over πa one needs only to minimize the driver function
g˜a over πat , for each fixed ω, t, π
−a
t and z
a. We define such pointwise minimizer as the random map
Πa(ω, t, π−at , z) := arg min
pia∈R2
g˜a(ω, t, πa, π−at , z), (ω, t, π
−a
t , z) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× (R
2)N−1 × R2,
and G˜a(t, π−at , z
a) := g˜a
(
t,Πa(t, π−a, za), π−at , z
a
)
as the minimized driver.
The pointwise minimization problem has, under Assumption 2.2, a unique minimizer which is
characterized by the first order conditions (FOC) for g˜a, i.e. ∇pia g˜a(t, πa, π−at , z
a) = 0. Recall that
σ = (σSS, 0). Using (3.4), the FOC is equivalently written as
∂pia,1 g˜
a(t, πa, π−a, za) = 0⇔
〈
(∇zg
a)(t, za − ζa),−σ
〉
− 〈σ, θ〉 = 0
⇔ gaz1(t, z
a − ζa) = −θS, (3.6)
∂pia,2 g˜
a(t, πa, π−a, za) = 0⇔
〈
(∇zg
a)(t, za − ζa),−κθ
〉
− 〈κθ, θ〉 = 0
⇔ −θS κS + gaz2(t, z
a − ζa)κR = −κSθS − κRθR
⇔ gaz2(t, z
a − ζa) = −θR, (3.7)
where we used (3.6) to obtain (3.7) under Assumption 3.1.
With Za from (2.5), the FOC system (3.6)–(3.7) is equivalent to za − ζat = Z
a(t,−θt). The
expression for ζ in (3.1) and elementary re-arrangements allow to rewrite za − ζat = Z
a(t,−θt) as
Πa,1(t, π−at , z
a)− λ˜aπ¯−a,1t =
za,1 −Za,1(t,−θt)
σSSt
−
za,2 −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
κSt
σSSt
,
Πa,2(t, π−at , z
a)− λ˜aπ¯−a,2t =
za,2 −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
.
(3.8)
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Plugging za − ζat = Z
a(t,−θt) into (3.3) yields an expression for the minimized (random) driver
G˜a(t, π−at , z
a) = ga
(
t,Za(t,−θt)
)
+ 〈Za(t,−θt), θt〉 − 〈z
a, θt〉 =: G˜
a(t, za). (3.9)
Since ga is generic at this point, the process Za(t,−θt) in not known precisely. Nonetheless, the
general structure of Πa and the minimized driver G˜a are determined. We stress two important
things. First, G˜a is an affine driver with stochastic coefficients. Second, G˜a does not depend at all
on π−a. This means that while the optimal strategy π∗,a (see below) depends on the strategies of
the other agents, the minimized risk does not. In [HPDR10], the authors did not obtain this general
form for the minimized driver.
Single-agent optimality
Since G˜a is an affine driver, and since ∇zG˜a = −θ ∈ HBMO, we have a unique solution to the
BSDE with driver G˜a and terminal condition −Ha provided that the process (ω, t) 7→ G˜a(t, 0) =
ga
(
t,Za(t,−θt)
)
+ 〈Za(t,−θt), θt〉 is integrable enough, which we assume. Let then (Y˜ a, Z˜a) be the
solution to BSDE (3.2) with driver (3.9) and define the strategy π∗,a· := Πa(·, π−a· , Z˜
a
· ). We now
prove that the above methodology indeed yields the solution to the individual risk minimization
problem, in other words the so-called best response.
Theorem 3.2 (Optimality for one agent). Assume the market price of risk θ = (θS, θR) ∈ HBMO and
let Assumption 3.1 hold. Fix an agent a ∈ A and a set of integrable strategies πb for b ∈ A\{a}. Assume
further that
• for G˜a given by (3.9), |G˜a(·, 0)|
1
2 ∈ HBMO, and
• π∗,a· = Π
a(·, π−a· , Z˜
a
· ) is admissible .
Then BSDE with driver (3.9) and terminal condition −Ha has a unique solution (Y˜ a, Z˜a) ∈ S∞ ×
HBMO. Moreover, Y˜
a
0 is the value of the optimization problem (3.5) (i.e. the minimized risk) for agent
a and π∗,a is the unique optimal strategy.
Proof. Given the structure of G˜a in (3.9) and the integrability assumption made, the existence and
uniqueness of the BSDE’s solution (Y˜ a, Z˜a) in S∞ ×HBMO is straightforward.
We first use the comparison theorem to prove the minimality of Y˜ a, and hence the optimality of
π∗,a. Let t ∈ [0, T ]. Take any strategy πa ∈ Aθ(π−a). First, from the definition of G˜a as a pointwise
minimum, we naturally have that G˜a(t, za) = g˜a
(
t,Πa(t, π−at , z
a), π−at , z
a
)
≤ g˜a(t, πat , π
−a
t , z
a) for
all t and za, that is, G˜a(·, ·) ≤ g˜a(·, πa· , π
−a
· , ·). Second, G˜
a is affine and thus Lipschitz, with Lipschitz
coefficient process −θ ∈ HBMO. By the comparison theorem, we therefore have, for any t ∈ [0, T ]
and in particular for t = 0, that Y˜ at = Y˜
a
t (π
∗,a, π−a) ≤ Y˜ at (π
a, π−a). As this holds for any πa ∈
Aθ(π−a), this proves the minimality of Y˜ a0 = ρ
a
0
(
ξa(π∗,a, π−a)
)
and thus the optimality of π∗,a.
We now argue the uniqueness of the optimizer π∗,a. Let πa be an admissible strategy and
let (Y˜ a(πa), Z˜a(πa)) be the corresponding risk, i.e. solution to the BSDE (3.2) with strategy πa.
We compute the difference Y˜ at (π
a) − Y˜ at (π
∗,a), adding-and-substracting in the Lebesgue integral
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g˜a
(
t,Πa
(
t, π−at , Z˜
a
t (π
a)
)
, π−at , Z˜
a
t (π
a)
)
= G˜a(t, Z˜at (π
a)), and using the affine form of G˜a :
Y˜ at (π
a)−Y˜ at (π
∗,a)
=
∫ T
t
[
g˜a
(
s, πas , π
−a
s , Z˜
a
s (π
a)
)
− G˜a
(
s, Z˜as (π
∗,a)
)]
ds−
∫ T
t
[Z˜as (π
a)− Z˜as (π
∗,a)]dWs
=
∫ T
t
[
g˜a
(
s, πas , π
−a
s , Z˜
a
s (π
a)
)
− g˜a
(
s,Πa
(
s, π−as , Z˜
a
s (π
a)
)
, π−as , Z˜
a
s (π
a)
) ]
ds (3.10)
−
∫ T
t
[Z˜as (π
a)− Z˜as (π
∗,a)]dW θs .
By construction of Πa as a minimizer, the difference in (3.10) is always positive. In particular, taking
Pθ-expectation w.r.t. Ft implies that Y˜ at (π
a) − Y˜ at (π
∗,a) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Assume that πa is an
optimal strategy. Then Y˜ a0 (π
a) = Y˜ a0 (π
∗,a) and the LHS for t = 0 vanishes. Under Pθ-expectation,
the stochastic integral on the RHS also vanishes and we can conclude that the integrand in (3.10)
is zero Pθ ⊗ Leb-a.e. Consequently, we obtain Y˜ a(πa) = Y˜ a(π∗,a) and hence Z˜a(πa) = Z˜a(π∗,a).
By uniqueness of the minimizer, we then have πa· = Π
a
(
·, π−a· , Z˜
a
· (π
a)
)
= Πa
(
·, π−a· , Z˜
a
· (π
∗,a)
)
=
π∗,a· .
Remark 3.3. While Theorem 3.2 is stated as the optimal response of a single agent a in the system
A with the other strategies π−a being fixed, it is clear that it can more generally describe the optimal
investment of an agent with preferences described by ga (equivalently, ρa· ) who trades in the assets S
and B, which have the given MPR θ (one can think of making A = {a}, or doing λa = 0). Following
the same methods, the result could be generalized to a higher number of assets, with price processes
given exogenously. This applies similarly to an agent trading in fewer assets, by setting the respective
components to zero – see Theorem 4.5.
We now state a characterization of the optimal strategy via the FOC.
Lemma 3.4. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, let π̂a be an admissible strategy and (Ŷ a, Ẑa)
be the associated risk process, solution to the BSDE with driver g˜a(t, π̂at , π
−a
t , ·) and terminal condition
−Ha. Assume that they satisfy the FOC (3.6)–(3.7) in the sense that
∇zg
a(t, Ẑat − ζ̂
a
t ) = −θt where ζ̂
a
t =
(
π̂a,1t σt + π̂
a,2
t κ
θ
t
)
− λ˜a
(
π¯−a,1t σt + π¯
−a,2
t κ
θ
t
)
.
Then (Ŷ a, Ẑa) = (Y˜ a, Z˜a) and π̂a = π∗,a.
Proof. By the assumptions on ga, ∇zga(t, Ẑat − ζ̂
a
t ) = −θt means that Ẑ
a
t − ζ̂
a
t = Z
a(t,−θt),
or equivalently π̂t = Πa(t, π
−a
t , Ẑ
a
t ). Therefore g˜
a(t, π̂at , π
−a
t , Ẑ
a
t ) = G˜
a(t, Ẑat ) – recall (3.3). By
uniqueness of the solution to the BSDE with driver G˜a(t, ·) and terminal condition −Ha, we have
(Ŷ a, Ẑa) = (Y˜ a, Z˜a). Consequently, by the uniqueness of the FOC’s solution, π̂at = Π
a(t, π−at , Ẑ
a
t ) =
Πa(t, π−at , Z˜
a
t ) = π
∗,a
t .
3.2 The unconstrained Nash equilibrium
Having solved the optimization problem for one agent, we now look at the existence and unique-
ness of a Nash equilibrium, still for the MPR θ ∈ HBMO fixed at the beginning of this section, and
still with no fixed-supply constraint.
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Assume π∗ = (π∗,a)a∈A is a Nash equilibrium. Fix an agent a ∈ A. From the uniqueness of the
optimal strategy, given by Theorem 3.2, one must have
π∗,at = Π
a(t, π∗,−at , Z˜
a
t ), t ∈ [0, T ],
where (Y˜ a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE with terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a given in
(3.9). From the characterization (3.8) of Πa, we therefore have, for all a ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ],
π∗,a,1t − λ˜
aπ¯∗,−a,1t =
Z˜a,1t −Z
a,1(t,−θt)
σSSt
−
Z˜a,2t −Z
a,2(t,−θt)
κRt
κSt
σSSt
=: Ja,1t ,
π∗,a,2t − λ˜
aπ¯∗,−a,2t =
Z˜a,2t −Z
a,2(t,−θt)
κRt
=: Ja,2t .
(3.11)
Note that, for any a ∈ A, the process (Y˜ a, Z˜a) does not depend on π∗,−a nor π∗,a, seeing as neither
−Ha nor G˜a does. Therefore, Jat is also independent of the unknown π
∗
t , which is only present in
the LHS of (3.11).
Conversely, assume we can solve for π∗ in Equation (3.11) and that π∗ is integrable against the
prices. Then, since π∗,at = Π
a(t, π∗,−at , Z˜
a
t ) by (3.8), Theorem 3.2 guarantees that π
∗,a is the best
response to π∗,−a, and we therefore have a Nash equilibrium.
So, the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium π∗ is equivalent to the existence and
uniqueness of solutions to Equation (3.11).
Define the matrix AN ∈ RN×N by3
AN =
 1 −
λ1
N−1
. . .
− λ
N
N−1 1
 , (3.12)
i.e. the j-th line has the entries −λ˜j = −λj/(N − 1), everywhere but for the j-th one which is 1.
Equation (3.11) can be rewritten as
AN π
∗,·,i = J ·,i, (3.13)
where π∗,·,i = (π∗,a,i)a∈A and J ·,i = (Ja,i)a∈A, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Theorem 3.5. Assume the market price of risk θ = (θS , θR) ∈ HBMO, that Assumption 3.1 and
Assumption 2.3 hold, that, for all a ∈ A, Ja is integrable against the prices and |G˜a(·, 0)|1/2 ∈ HBMO.
Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium π∗ = (π∗,a)a∈A associated with the MPR θ, which is
given by the unique solution to (3.13).
Proof. The determinant of the AN is
det(AN ) = 1−
∑
i<j
λ˜iλ˜j − 2
∑
i<j<k
λ˜iλ˜j λ˜k − 3
∑
i<j<k<l
λ˜iλ˜jλ˜kλ˜l − . . . − (N − 1)
N∏
i=1
λ˜i,
where the sums run over indices i, j, k, l from A = {1, . . . , N}. If λa = 1 for all a ∈ A, then
det(AN ) = 1 −
∑N
k=2
k−1
(N−1)k
(
N
k
)
= 0, so the matrix is not invertible. The determinant is strictly
3Recall the notation that for sums and products over certain subsets of A we identify A with the set {1, 2, . . . , N},
where N ∈ N is the fixed finite number of agents.
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decreasing in each λ˜a (a ∈ A) and therefore also in λa. Hence, if λa ∈ [0, 1] for all a ∈ A and the
product
∏
a∈A λ
a < 1, then at least one factor must be strictly smaller than one and the determinant
must be strictly positive (i.e. det(AN ) > 0). The invertibility of AN follows. This guarantees that one
can solve system (3.11) (or, equivalently, (3.13)) for each i ∈ {1, 2} to obtain (π∗,·,i). The integrabil-
ity of π∗ follows from fact that each component π∗,a is a linear combination of the integrable Ja’s.
Finally, the Nash-optimality of π∗ was argued in the identification of the core Equation (3.11).
We can now comment on Assumption 2.3. If λb = 0 for all b ∈ A \ {a}, then AN is invertible
independent of λa, i.e. in particular for λa = 1. This shows that the condition that λa ∈ [0, 1) for
all a ∈ A is not necessary, but merely a sufficient condition. Finally, if we were to allow for λa > 1,
then
∏
a λ
a < 1 is not sufficient for invertibility of AN , e.g. in the case N = 3 take λa = λb = 2 and
λc = 0.
From now on we assume the agents’ optimization problems have a solution so that it makes
sense to discuss the notion of equilibrium market price of risk (EMPR).
Remark 3.6. Notice that at this point, as θ is given exogenously, we do not yet have a system of
coupled BSDEs. For each a ∈ A, we obtain the value process (Y˜ a, Z˜a) as the solution to a BSDE where
the terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a, which does not depend on the strategies and only takes
Z˜a as argument. These processes are then used to solve for the Nash equilibrium of strategies π∗, and
so (Y˜ a, Z˜a)a∈A is the value process of the Nash equilibrium. This feature (no coupling of the BSDEs
when solving for the optimal values), as well as the fact that solving for the optimizers π∗ of the Nash
equilibrium reduces to solving a linear system (for which existence and uniqueness of the solution is
equivalent to the invertibility of a matrix) is a consequence of the structure of the problem, i.e. the form
of the concerns over the relative performance. In particular, it does not depend on the specific form of
the individual risk measures ρa (or equivalently, the drivers ga). Finding the EMPR, later on in Section
4, leads to multi-dimensional quadratic BSDEs.
3.3 An example: the entropic risk measure case
We now illustrate the methodology and result of Theorem 3.2 for a particular risk measure, and
prepare the ground for the model we study in Sections 5 and 6. We give a sequence of examples, in
increasing order of complexity, that show how the structure of the optimal strategies is changing as
features are added. As in the above, the examples do not yet take into account the market clearing
condition but rather assume that a market price of risk θ = (θS , θR) ∈ HBMO is given. Nonetheless
they give a flavor for the next section where the equilibrium market price of risk is derived.
Each agent a ∈ A is assessing her risk using the entropic risk measure ρa0 for which the driver
ga : R2 → R if given by
ga(z) :=
1
2γa
|z|2, where γa > 0 is agent a’s risk tolerance,
and 1/γa is agent a’s risk aversion. This choice of ga relates to exponential utilities, and we have
(see e.g. [Car09], [FK11], [HIM05] or [REK00])
ρa0(ξ) = Y
a
0 = γa lnE[e
−ξ/γa ] = γa ln
(
− Uγa(ξ)
)
with Uγa(ξ) = E[−e
−ξ/γa ],
so that, equivalently, the agents are maximizing their expected (exponential) utility.
In what follows, the optimal strategies were computed using the techniques described so far
and hence we omit the calculations. They boil down to finding the map Za arising from (2.5), then
injecting it in (3.8) and (3.9) to obtain G˜a. We denote throughout by π∗,a (for a ∈ A) the optimal
Nash equilibrium strategy.
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3.3.1 The reference case of a single agent
For comparison, we first give the optimal strategy for a single agent who could trade liquidly in
the stock of price S and the derivative of price B with (arbitrary and exogenously-given) market
price of risk θ = (θS , θR). She aims at minimizing her risk, with terminal endowment and trading
gains ξa = Ha+V aT (π
a). Here, other agents do not play a role. Since ga
zi
(z) = zi/γa, it is easily found
that Za(t,−θt) = (−γaθSt ,−γaθ
R
t ) = −γaθt. Injecting this in (3.9) yields the minimized driver G˜
a,
G˜a(t, za) = −
γa
2
|θt|
2 − 〈za, θt〉 , t ∈ [0, T ].
The minimized risk is then given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE with
terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a, while the optimal strategy is then given by
π∗,a,1 =
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
−
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
and π∗,a,2 =
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
.
This result is expected and in line with canonical mathematical finance results. The particular struc-
ture of the optimal strategy follows from the fact that the second asset is correlated to the first when
κS 6= 0, and the inversion of the volatility matrix for the 2-dimensional price (S,B),[
σSS 0
κS κR
]
.
The market faced by a is complete, the driver for the minimized residual risk Y˜ a is affine and we
have the explicit solution
Y˜ a0 = E
θ
[
−Ha −
γa
2
∫ T
0
|θu|
2du
]
= −E
[
E−θT ·
(
Ha +
γa
2
∫ T
0
|θu|
2du
)]
.
The minimized risk measure is affine with respect to Ha : the trend (θ 6= 0) in the prices leads to a
constant risk reduction and the completeness of the market leads to an affine dependence on Ha.
Remark 3.7. Note that G˜a(t, 0) = −γa2 |θt|
2. Therefore, since θ ∈ HBMO, the assumption we made
in Theorems 3.2 and 3.5 that |G˜a(t, 0)|1/2 ∈ HBMO is satisfied, ensuring the well-posedness of the
minimized-risk BSDEs.
3.3.2 The reference case of a single agent that cannot trade in the derivative
It is also instructive, and will be useful later on, to look at the case where this single agent cannot
trade in the derivative, and hence faces an incomplete market. We first enforce πa,2 = 0 on (3.4),
then we optimize over πa,1 (see Remark 3.3). The minimized driver following the calculations is
G˜a(t, z) = −
γa
2
(θSt )
2 − z1 θSt +
1
2γa
(z2)2, t ∈ [0, T ].
Notice that G˜a is affine in the variable z1 but retains the quadratic term in z2. The minimized risk
is then given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE with terminal condition −Ha
and the above driver G˜a, while the optimal strategy is
π∗,a,1 =
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
and π∗,a,2 = 0.
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3.3.3 The case of multiple agents without relative performance concerns
We return to the full set of agents A and take λa = 0 for all a ∈ A; this is the setting covered in
[HPDR10]. We find the minimized risk-driver for agent a to be
G˜a(t, za) = −
γa
2
|θt|
2 − 〈za, θt〉 , t ∈ [0, T ].
The minimized risk is given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 , where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) solves the BSDE with terminal condition
−Ha and minimized driver G˜a, while the optimal strategies are given by
πλ=0,a,1 :=
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
−
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
and πλ=0,a,2 :=
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
. (3.14)
Observe that in this case the strategy πλ=0,a followed by a does not depend directly on the strategies
of the other agents; its structure is the same as for the single agent case. However, when the price
dynamics of the derivative is not fixed but emerges from the equilibrium, later on, the other agents’
strategies will appear indirectly via θR and κ.
3.3.4 The case of multiple agents without relative performance concerns in zero net supply
If one would want to take into account the endogenous trading of the derivative in the particular
situation of pure risk trading, where one takes n = 0 in (2.8), then the market price of external risk
θR must be endogenously computed instead of being fixed arbitrarily as we have done so far.
It is not difficult to see, summing the last equation in (3.14) over a ∈ A and imposing the zero-
net supply condition,
∑
a π
λ=0,a,2 = 0, that this requires that θR = −
∑
a Z˜
a,2/
∑
a γa. However the
Z˜ ·,2s are themselves found by solving a system of N BSDEs which involve θR. Replacing θR by the
expression above in the said system of equations leads to a fully coupled system of quadratic BSDEs
that is hard to solve in general. We solve this problem with an alternative tool in Section 4.
3.3.5 The general case: multiple agents with performance concerns
In the general case (not assuming λa = 0 for all a), we obtain the minimal driver as being still
G˜a(t, za) = −
γa
2
|θt|
2 − 〈za, θt〉 , t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.15)
The minimized risk is then given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE with
terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a, while the optimal strategies π∗ = (π∗,a)a∈A are given by
π∗,a,1 − λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
π∗,b,1 =
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
−
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
, (3.16)
π∗,a,2 − λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
π∗,b,2 =
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
. (3.17)
The general invertibility of the systems (3.16) and (3.17) given θ is guaranteed by Proposition 3.5.
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3.3.6 The general case: multiple agents with performance concerns in zero net supply
If one imposes (2.8) with n = 0, implying that
∑
b∈A\{a} π
∗,b,2 = −π∗,a,2, then the linear system
(3.17) for the investment in the derivative simplifies greatly and its solution is explicitly given by
π∗,a,2 =
1
1 + λ˜a
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
for all a ∈ A. (3.18)
Notice how the structure of the optimal investment strategy for the derivative in (3.18) is that of
(3.14), scaled down by the factor (1 + λ˜a)−1. In Section 6 we study a model with two agents and
computations will be done explicitly for the investment in the stock (i.e. the inversion of the system
(3.16)).
3.4 Reduction to zero net supply
We now give an auxiliary result allowing to simplify the condition (2.8). We show how the
initial holdings πa,2
0−
= πa,20 6= 0 before/at the beginning of the game can be reduced to the case
where πa,2
0−
= πa,20 = 0. This allows us to apply (2.8) with n = 0, which will prove crucial in later
computations. The reduction to n = 0 is based on the monotonicity of the risk measures and the
following lemma, stated from the point of view of one agent a ∈ A. The result is based on Lemma
3.9 in [HPDR10].
To avoid a notational overload, we omit explicit dependencies on π−a in this subsection.
Lemma 3.8. For a given MPR θ and admissible strategies π−a = (πb)b∈A\{a}, consider the dynamics of
the residual risk BSDE
−dY˜ at (π
a) = g˜a
(
t, πat , Z˜
a
t (π
a)
)
dt− 〈Z˜at (π
a),dWt〉 (3.19)
associated with the preferences of agent a using an admissible strategy πa. Assume further that (3.19)
has a unique solution for any given FT -measurable bounded terminal condition Y˜T . Let ν ∈ R. Then,
• if πa := (πa,1, πa,2) minimizes the solution Y˜0(π
a) to (3.19) for a terminal condition −Ha,
then πˇa := (πa,1, πa,2 − ν) is optimal for the terminal condition −(Ha + νHD);
• if πa := (πa,1, πa,2) minimizes the solution Y˜0(π
a) for a terminal condition −(Ha + νHD),
then π̂a := (πa,1, πa,2 + ν) is optimal for the terminal condition −Ha.
Proof. We prove only the first assertion, as the second is equivalent. Let t ∈ [0, T ]. Assume that
π∗,a ∈ Aθ(π−a) is optimal for (3.19) with Y˜ aT := −H
a, i.e. for any πa ∈ Aθ one has Y˜ a0 (π
∗,a) ≤
Y˜ a0 (π
a). Define further, for any πa ∈ Aθ, the strategies
πˇa := πa − (0, ν) = (πa,1, πa,2 − ν) and πˇ∗,a := π∗,a − (0, ν).
To show that Y a0 (πˇ
∗,a) ≤ Y a0 (πˇ
a) for any πˇa where Y a solves (3.19) with Y aT = −(H
a + νHD) we
first show an identity result between the BSDEs with different terminal conditions. The second step
is the optimality.
Step 1: We show that the process (Y (πˇa), Z(πˇa)) := (Y˜ a(πa)− νBθ, Z˜a(πa)− νκθ) solves BSDE
Yt(πˇ
a) = −(Ha + νHD) +
∫ T
t
g˜a (s, πˇas , Zs(πˇ
a)) ds−
∫ T
t
〈Zs(πˇ
a),dWs〉. (3.20)
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To this end, we reformulate (2.4) as a BSDE:
Bθt = H
D −
∫ T
t
〈κθs, θs〉ds−
∫ T
t
〈κθs,dWs〉. (3.21)
The difference between (3.19) and ν times (3.21) yields
Y˜t(π
a)− νBθt = −(H
a + νHD) +
∫ T
t
[
g˜a(s, πas , Z˜
a
s (π
a)) + ν〈κθs, θs〉
]
ds−
∫ T
t
〈Z˜as (π
a)− νκθs,dWs〉
⇔ Yt(πˇ
a) = −(Ha + νHD)−
∫ T
t
〈Zs(πˇ
a),dWs〉
+
∫ T
t
[
g˜a
(
s, πˇas + (0, ν), Zs(πˇ
a) + νκθs
)
+ ν〈κθs, θs〉
]
ds.
In view of (3.4), we can manipulate the terms inside driver g˜a above and obtain
g˜a
(
·, πˇa + (0, ν), Za(πˇa) + νκθ
)
+ ν
〈
κθ, θ
〉
= ga
(
·, (Za(πˇa) + νκθ)− πˇa,1σ − (πˇa,2 + ν)κθ + λ˜a
(
π¯−a,1σ + π¯−a,2κθ
))
− πˇa,1 〈σ, θ〉 − (πˇa,2 + ν)
〈
κθ, θ
〉
+ λ˜a
〈
π¯−a,1σ + π¯−a,2κθ, θ
〉
+ ν
〈
κθ, θ
〉
= g˜a
(
·, πˇa, Za(πˇa)
)
.
Given the assumed uniqueness of BSDE (3.19) the assertion follows.
Step 2: Given that (Y (πˇa), Z(πˇa)) solve (3.20) and that π∗,a is the minimizing strategy for πa 7→
Y˜ a(πa), then manipulating Y (πˇa) = Y˜ a(πa)− νBθ, we have
Y0(πˇ
a) = Y˜ a0 (π
a)− νBθ0 ≥ Y˜
a
0 (π
∗,a)− νBθ0 = Y0(πˇ
∗,a),
and hence πˇ∗,a := π∗,a−(0, ν) is optimal for BSDE (3.19) with terminal condition −(Ha+νHD).
This lemma intuitively states that an agent a, owning at time t = 0 a portion νa = πa,2
0−
= πa,20
of units of HD, can be regarded as being in fact endowed with Hˇa = Ha + νaHD. One then looks
only at the relative portfolio πˇa,2 = πa,2 − νa, which counts the derivatives bought and sold only
from time t = 0 onwards: the optimization problem is equivalent. The argument can be extended
to all other agents. We note that this reduction is only possible because we do not consider trading
constraints in this work, so that the strategies πa,2 and πˇa,2 are equally admissible.
For the rest of this work we assume that each agent receives at t = T a portion4 n/N of the
derivative HD. By doing so, the market clearing condition in Definition 2.5 transforms into∑
a∈A
πa,2t = 0 P⊗ Leb− a.e.,
and we refer to it as the zero net supply condition.
For clarity, we recall that agent a ∈ A now assesses her risk by solving the dynamics provided by
BSDE (2.7) with terminal condition
Y aT = −
(
Ha +
n
N
HD + V a,θT (π
a)− λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
V b,θT (π
b)
)
(3.22)
4Many possibilities for this reduction to zero net supply exist, including endowing one agent with the total amount n
of derivatives HD or endowing each agent with their initial portions of the derivative νa. We make the judicious choice
of n/N for simplicity.
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(instead of that in (2.7)). Moreover, by applying the change of variables (3.1) to BSDE (2.7) with
terminal condition (3.22), we reach
−dY˜ at = g˜
a(t, πat , π
−a
t , Z˜
a
t )dt− 〈Z˜
a
t ,dWt〉, Y˜
a
T := −
(
Ha +
n
N
HD
)
, (3.23)
with g˜a given by (3.4) (and (Y˜ a, Z˜a) relates to (Y a, Za) via the change of variables (3.1)).
It is straightforward to recompile the results of Section 3.3 under the zero net supply condition.
It entails no changes in the strategies or drivers, only the terminal condition of the involved BSDEs
need to be updated from −Ha to −(Ha + nNH
D) as in (3.23).
4 The equilibrium market price of external risk
In the previous section we saw how to compute the Nash equilibrium for a given market price
of risk θ = (θS, θR), without the global constraint on trading (market clearing condition). In this
section we solve the equilibrium problem, as posed by Definition 2.5, by finding the Equilibrium
Market Price of external Risk (EMPeR) θR.
The literature contains many results on equilibria in complete markets that link competitive
equilibria to an optimization problem for a representative agent, and this is the approach we use
here. The preferences of the representative agent are usually given by a weighted average of the
individual agents’ preferences with the weights depending on the competitive equilibrium to be
supported by the representative agent, see [Neg60]. This dependence results in complex fixed point
problems which renders the analysis and computation of equilibria quite cumbersome. The many
results on risk sharing under translation invariant preferences, in particular [BE05, JST06, FK08],
suggest that when the preferences are translation invariant, then all the weights are equal. This was
an effective strategy in [HPDR10] and it would be so here if, for all a ∈ A, λa = 0, or λa = λ ∈ [0, 1).
In a market without performance concerns, [HPDR10,BE09] show that the infimal convolution
of risk measures gives rise to a suitable risk measure for the representative agent which, for g-
conditional risk measures, corresponds to infimal convolution of the drivers. Due to the performance
concerns, we use a weighted-dilated infimal convolution and, in Theorem 4.5 we show that indeed
minimizing the risk of our representative agent is equivalent to finding a competitive equilibrium in
our market.
4.1 The representative agent
Aggregation of risks and aggregation of drivers
Inspired by the above mentioned results and having in mind [Rüs13] (see Remark 4.9 below)
we deal with the added inter-dependency arising from the fixed-supply condition and the additional
unknown θR (see examples in 3.3.4 and 3.3.6) by defining a new risk measure ρw0 . For a set of
positive weights w = (wa)a∈A satisfying
∑
a∈A w
a = 1, we define
ρw0 (X) = inf
{∑
a∈A
waρa0
(
Xa
) ∣∣∣∣ (Xa) ∈ (L∞)N : ∑
a∈A
waXa = X
}
for any X ∈ L∞. (4.1)
In the case of risk measures induced by BSDEs, [BE05] shows that the measure defined by inf-
convolution of risk measures (ρa0)a∈A is again induced by a BSDE, whose driver is simply the inf-
convolution of the BSDE drivers ga for the risk measures (ρa0)a∈A. For the set of weights w = (w
a)a∈A,
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we define the driver gw as theweighted-dilated inf-convolution of the drivers ga for (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R2,
gw(t, z) = w
(
(ga)a∈A
)
(t, z) = inf
{∑
a∈A
waga(t, za)
∣∣∣∣ (za) ∈ (R2)N s.t. ∑
a∈A
waza = z
}
, (4.2)
where the notation 
(
(ga)a∈A
)
is that of the standard inf-convolution.
Lemma 4.1 (Properties of gw). The map gw : [0, T ] × R2 → R defined by (4.2) is a deterministic
continuous function, strictly convex and continuously differentiable. Moreover, there exists a unique
solution of ∇zg
w(t,Z) = −ϑ in Z.
For a zA = (za) such that
∑
a w
aza = z, one has gw(t, z) =
∑
a w
aga(t, za) if and only if there
exists ϑ ∈ R2 such that, for all a ∈ A, ∇zg
a(t, za) = −ϑ. In that case, one has ∇zg
w(t, z) = −ϑ.
Proof. The weighted inf-convolution transfers the properties of the ga ’s to gw, in particular con-
tinuity, strict convexity and differentiability. We do not show these as they follow from a simple
adaptation of known arguments, see [BE05,BE09,HPDR10].
Since the function being minimized (zA = (za) 7→
∑
aw
aga(za)) is convex and the function
defining the constraint (zA 7→
∑
aw
aza) is also convex, because affine, the minimization defining
gw is equivalent to finding a critical point for the associated Lagrangian, L(zA, ϑ) =
∑
aw
aga(za) +
ϑ(
∑
a w
aza − z). Therefore, for a zA = (za) such that
∑
a w
aza = z, zA is a minimizer if and only
if there exists ϑ ∈ R2 such that, for all a ∈ A, ∇zga(t, za) = −ϑ. Then, ∇zgw(t, z) = −ϑ where ϑ is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with z.
The risk of the random terminal wealth ξw, measured through ρw0 , is given by ρ
w
0 (ξ
w) := Y w0
where (Y w, Zw) is the solution to the BSDE
−dY wt = g
w(t, Zwt )dt− 〈Z
w
t ,dWt〉, with terminal condition Y
w
T = −ξ
w. (4.3)
Since the weights (wa)a∈A are required to satisfy
∑
a w
a = 1, the risk measure ρw0 associated to the
BSDE with the above driver is a monetary risk measure. Translation invariance and monotonicity
follow from the fact that the driver gw is independent of y. Convexity follows from the convexity of
gw, which in turns follows from that of the ga’s by the envelope theorem.
Remark 4.2. Notice that (4.2) can be rewritten
gw(t, z) = inf
{∑
a∈A
waga
(
t,
za
wa
) ∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A
za = z
}
.
In this way, gw is seen as the usual w-weighted infimal convolution of the wa-dilated drivers ga, in the
terminology from [BE09] (p.137). For more on dilated risk measures, see Proposition 3.4 in [BE09].
Example 4.3 (Entropic risk measure). For entropic agents, i.e. with drivers ga(za) = |z
a|2
2γa
, one obtains
gw(z) =
|z|2
2γR
, with γR :=
∑
a∈A
waγa. (4.4)
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Trading and the risky position of the representative agent
Having defined the aggregated risk measure ρw0 and the associated driver g
w, we now introduce
a strategy πw and associated trading gains V·(πw) =
∫ ·
0 π
w,1
t dSt +
∫ ·
0 π
w,2
t dBt for a representative
agent whose preferences are described by gw. Direct computations from (4.1) entail that we assign
to the representative agent the terminal gains
ξw :=
∑
a∈A
waξa =
∑
a∈A
wa
(
Ha +
n
N
HD + V aT − λ˜
aV¯ −aT
)
=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) +
∑
a∈A
wa
(
(1 + λ˜a)V aT − λ˜
a
∑
b∈A
V bT
)
=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) +
∑
a∈A
V aT
(
(1 + λ˜a)− λ˜a
∑
b∈A
wbλ˜b
)
= Hw + VT (π
w),
where ca := wa(1 + λ˜a) −
∑
b∈A w
bλ˜b, πw =
∑
a∈A c
aπa is the representative agent’s portfolio,
VT (π
w) =
∑
a∈A c
aVT (π
a) is the representative agent’s wealth process and
Hw :=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) =
n
N
HD +
∑
a∈A
waHa (4.5)
is defined as the representative agent’s terminal endowment.
We now choose the weights (wa)a∈A such that ca = c for any a ∈ A for some c ∈ (0,+∞), i.e.
wa :=
1
Λ(1 + λ˜a)
for all a ∈ A, where Λ :=
∑
a∈A
1
1 + λ˜a
. (4.6)
Direct verification yields
∑
aw
a = 1 and, furthermore, for all a ∈ A,
ca = c :=
1
Λ
−
1
Λ
∑
b∈A
λ˜b
1 + λ˜b
.
Notice that πw,2 =
∑
a∈A c
aπa,2 = c
∑
a∈A π
a,2. In other words, the zero net supply condition for the
individual agents (i.e.
∑
a∈A π
a,2 = 0) is equivalent to the representative agent not investing in HD
(i.e. πw,2 = 0). From now on, the family of weights w is fixed and is given by (4.6).
The pointwise minimizer for the representative agent’s residual risk
We now show that the approach by aggregated risk and representative agent, as motivated
above, allows to identify the equilibrium market price of risk as a by-product of minimizing the risk
of the representative agent. This risk is given by the solution to BSDE (4.3) with terminal condition
Y wT = −ξ
w = −Hw−VT (π
w), for admissible strategies πw of the form πw = (πw,1, 0). The R2-valued
strategy process πw is said to be admissible (πw ∈ Aw) if Eθ [〈 V·(πw) 〉T ] < ∞ and the BSDE (4.3)
has a unique solution. Following Section 3 we introduce the residual risk processes
Y˜ wt := Y
w
t + V
w
t and accordingly Z˜
w
t := Z
w
t +
(
πw,1t σt + 0
)
.
The pair (Y˜ w, Z˜w) satisfies the BSDE with terminal condition Y˜ wT = −H
w and random driver g˜w,
defined for (ω, t, πwt , z) ∈ Ω× [0, T ] × R
2 × R2, by
g˜w(t, πwt , z) := g
w
(
t, z − ζwt
)
− 〈ζwt , θt〉 ,
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where ζw = πw,1σ + 0 (compare with (3.1)-(3.4)). Since Y˜ w0 = Y
w
0 , the representative agent then
equivalently aims at solving for min{Y˜ w0 (π
w)|πw ∈ Aw}.
Following the methodology used for the single agent in Section 3, we first look at minimizing the
driver g˜w pointwise. We define Πw,1(t, z) as the optimizer for min
{
g˜w(t, (p, 0), z) | p ∈ R
}
, setting
Πw,2(t, z) = 0 as to enforce the zero-net supply condition. Since gw is strictly convex, so is the
function g˜w, and the minimum is characterized by the solution to first-order condition
gwz1
(
t, z −Πw,1(t, z)σt
)
= −θSt .
We denote the minimized (random) driver by
G˜w(t, z) = g˜w
(
t,Πw(t, z), z
)
. (4.7)
Remark 4.4 (The structure for the optimized driver (4.7) under a separation assumption). Here,
unlike for the optimization of individual agents who trade in S and B under a fixed MPR θ = (θS, θR),
we do not have a nice structure like in (3.9) for G˜w in all generality on gw (hence on the ga’s).
Assume that for some g1,w, g2,w : [0, T ]×R→ R we have gw(t, z) = g1,w(t, z1)+g2,w(t, z2), then the
first-order condition would translate to g1,w
z1
(
t, z1 −Πw,1(t, z)σSSt
)
= −θSt . Denoting by Z
w,1(t,−θSt )
the solution in Z1 ∈ R to the equation g1,w
z1
(
t,Z1
)
= −θSt , the structure for Π
w,1 is given by
Πw,1(t, z) =
z1 −Zw,1(t,−θSt )
σSSt
and the structure for the optimized driver G˜w is given by
G˜w(t, z) = gw
(
t, (Zw,1(t,−θSt ), z
2)
)
+ Zw,1(t,−θSt )θ
S
t − z
1θSt
=
[
g1,w
(
t,Zw,1(t,−θSt )
)
+Zw,1(t,−θSt )θ
S
t
]
− z1θSt + g
2,w(t, z2).
The special case of entropic drivers, that falls in this category, is discussed below in Example 4.6.
Optimimality for the representative agent and the equilibrium market price of external risk
We assume that the BSDE with driver G˜w defined in (4.7) and terminal condition −Hw has a
unique solution (Y˜ w, Z˜w) in S∞ × HBMO. Define the strategy π∗,w by π
∗,w
t :=
(
Πw,1(ω, t, Z˜wt ), 0
)
.
Like for the individual agents in Section 3, the following theorem asserts that π∗,w is the optimal
strategy and Y˜ w0 is the minimized risk for the representative agent. Moreover, the theorem relates
the equilibrium market price of risk (EMPR) θ = (θS, θR) (recall Definition 2.5) to the solution of
the representative agent’s optimization problem. Recall the family of weights w given by (4.6).
Theorem 4.5. Assume that
• the BSDE with driver G˜w, (4.7), and Y˜ wT = −H
w has a unique solution (Y˜ w, Z˜w) in S∞×HBMO,
• the comparison theorem holds for the BSDE with driver G˜w,
• π∗,w· =
(
Πw,1(ω, ·, Z˜w· ), 0
)
is integrable against the prices S and B,
then Y˜ w0 is the minimized risk for the representative agent and π
∗,w is the unique optimal strategy that
minimizes his risk.
22
If, for the process θ∗ = (θS, θR), with θR defined by
gwz2
(
t, Z˜wt − π
∗,w,1
t σt
)
= −θRt , (4.8)
the conditions of Theorem 3.5 hold, then θ∗ is the unique EMPR for the agents in A.
Additionally, the minimized aggregated risk Y˜ w is linked to the individual minimized risks (Y˜ a)a∈A
through the identity Y˜ w =
∑
a w
aY˜ a (the same holds for Z˜). Moreover, the Nash equilibrium for the
agents in A satisfies π∗,w = c
∑
a π
∗,a.
Example 4.6 (The entropic case). In the entropic case, we have found gw(z) = |z|
2
2γR
, so we have
Zw,1(t,−θSt ) = −γRθ
S
t . The minimized driver is then
G˜w(t, z) = −
γR
2
(θSt )
2 − z1θSt +
1
2γR
(z2)2,
as was found in Subsection 3.3. This driver is quadratic and regular, and the terminal condition−Hw is
bounded. From [Kob00,IDR10] there is a unique solution (Y˜ w, Z˜w) in S∞×HBMO and the comparison
theorem applies (see [Kob00,MY10]). The optimal strategies are
π∗,w,1 =
Z˜w,1 + γRθ
S
σSS
and π∗,w,2 = 0.
With Z˜w ∈ HBMO and θ
S bounded, π∗,w,1 is integrable against S. This verifies the first three assumptions
of the theorem. Furthermore, with (4.8) and since Z˜w ∈ HBMO and θS is bounded, we find that
θR = −
Z˜w,2
γR
and θ∗ = (θS , θR) ∈ HBMO. (4.9)
Following on Remark 3.3, the optimality of π∗,w and (Y˜ w, Z˜w), for an agent w with preferences
described by gw and trades in S, is obtained exactly in the same way as the optimality for a single
agent a ∈ A in Theorem 3.2. So we prove only the claims of Theorem 4.5 related to the EMPR θ∗.
First, however, we state a counterpart to Lemma 3.4 to the case when no trading in B is possible.
Lemma 4.7. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.5, let π̂w = (π̂w,1, 0) be an admissible strategy
and (Ŷ w, Ẑw) be the associated risk process, i.e. the solution to the BSDE with driver g˜w(t, π̂wt , ·) and
terminal condition −Hw. Assume that the FOC holds for these processes, i.e.
gwz1(t, Ẑ
w
t − ζ̂
w
t ) = −θ
S
t where ζ̂
w
t = π̂
w,1
t σt.
Then (Ŷ w, Ẑw) = (Y˜ w, Z˜w) and π̂w = π∗,w.
Proof. Recalling the properties of gw (see Lemma 4.1) and the definition of Πw,1, the condition
gwz1(t, Ẑ
w
t − π̂
w,1
t σt) = −θ
S
t means that π̂
w,1
t = Π
w,1(t, Ẑwt ). We have then g˜
w(t, π̂wt , Ẑ
w
t ) = G˜
w(t, Ẑwt )
(recall (4.7)). By the assumed uniqueness of the solution to the BSDE with driver G˜w(t, ·) and ter-
minal condition −Hw, we have (Ŷ w, Ẑw) = (Y˜ w, Z˜w). Consequently, by the uniqueness of the FOC’s
solution, π̂w,1t = Π
w,1(t, Ẑwt ) = Π
w,1(t, Z˜wt ) = π
∗,w,1
t . Since both strategies have second component
equal to zero, we have therefore π̂w = π∗,w.
The next result, to be used in the proof of Theorem 4.5, states that aggregating the solutions
to the individual optimization problems leads to an optimum for the aggregated preference gw and
identifies the BSDE of the aggregation with the weighted sum of the agents’ BSDEs.
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Lemma 4.8. Let ϑ ∈ HBMO be a MPR and assume the conditions of Theorem 3.5. Let then (π
∗,a)a∈A
be the unconstrained Nash equilibrium associated with ϑ, and let (Y˜ a, Z˜a) be the solution to the
minimized-risk BSDE for each agent a ∈ A (BSDE (3.2) with driver (3.9)). Define (Ŷ w, Ẑw) :=∑
aw
a(Y˜ a, Z˜a) and π̂w :=
∑
a c
aπ∗,a = c
∑
a π
∗,a.
Then (Ŷ w, Ẑw) and π̂w are the minimal risk and optimal strategy for a single agent whose prefer-
ences are given by gw, who can invest in (S,B) (without trading constraints).
Proof. Firstly, we sum the individual risk BSDEs to obtain (Ŷ w, Ẑw) and its BSDE. We have Ŷ wT =
−
∑
aw
aHa = −Hw and also
dŶ wt = −
[∑
a∈A
wa
{
ga
(
t, Z˜at − ζ
a
t (π
∗)
)
− 〈ζat (π
∗), ϑt〉
}]
dt+
∑
a∈A
wa〈Z˜at ,dWt〉
= −
[∑
a∈A
waga
(
t, Z˜at − ζ
a
t (π
∗)
)
−
〈
ζ̂wt , ϑt
〉]
dt+ 〈Ẑwt ,dWt〉,
where ζ̂w = π̂w,1σ + π̂w,2κ =
∑
aw
aζa(π∗). We remark that, on the one hand,∑
a
wa(Z˜at − ζ
a
t (π
∗)) =
∑
a
waZ˜at −
(∑
a
caπ∗,a,1σt +
∑
a
caπ∗,a,2κt
)
= Ẑwt − ζ̂
w
t ,
and, on the other hand, for all a ∈ A, by the optimality of π˜a and (Y˜ a, Z˜a)
∇zg
a
(
t, Z˜at − ζ
a
t
)
= −ϑt.
Therefore, we know by Lemma 4.1 that gw(t, Ẑwt − ζ̂
w
t ) =
∑
a w
aga(t, Z˜at − ζ
a
t ). This implies that
dŶ wt = −
[
gw(t, Ẑwt − ζ̂
w
t )− 〈ζ̂
w
t , ϑt〉
]
dt+ 〈Ẑwt ,dWt〉
= −g˜w(t, π̂wt , Ẑ
w
t )dt+ 〈Ẑ
w
t ,dWt〉.
Secondly, by Lemma 4.1, we also know that ∇zgw
(
t, Ẑwt − ζ̂
w
t
)
= −ϑt.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.4, we obtain that (Ŷ w, Ẑw) is the solution to the minimized-risk BSDE
for an agent with preferences given by gw from (3.9), terminal condition −Hw, who trades in S and
B under the given MPR ϑ with π̂w as the optimal strategy.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. The first part of the proof of the theorem, the optimization for the represen-
tative agent, follows through arguments similar to those used in the single agent case, see Theorem
3.2 and Remark 3.3. Hence we omit it.
⊲ Existence of the EMPR. Here we prove that θ∗ = (θS, θR), defined through (4.8), is indeed an
EMPR. Since θ∗ ∈ HBMO and the conditions of Theorem 3.5 hold, let (π∗,a)a∈A be the unique uncon-
strained Nash equilibrium under the MPR θ∗, and let (Y˜ a, Z˜a) be the solution to the minimized-risk
BSDE for each agent a ∈ A. Our goal now is to prove that
∑
a π
∗,a,2 = 0.
Let us introduce (Ŷ w, Ẑw) :=
∑
a w
a(Y˜ a, Z˜a) and π̂w :=
∑
a c
aπ∗,a = c
∑
a π
∗,a. From Lemma
4.8, π̂w and Ŷ w are the optimal strategy and risk for a single agent with risk preferences encoded
by gw trading S and B under θ∗ without trading constraints.
Meanwhile, we defined π∗,w = (π∗,w,1, 0) as the optimal strategy for an agent w with preferences
encoded by gw and who can only invest in S (with MPR θS). By construction of θR, we have
∇zg
w
(
t, Z˜wt − ζ
w
t
)
= −θ∗t , where ζ
w
t = π
∗,w,1
t σt.
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It results from Lemma 3.4 that π∗,w is also the optimal strategy for an agent with preferences gw
and who can invest in S and B, with given MPR θ∗. By the uniqueness in Lemma 3.4 we therefore
have π̂w = π∗,w. This implies in particular that
∑
a π
∗,a,2 = π̂w,2 = π∗,w,2 = 0. We have therefore
proved that the Nash equilibrium associated with θ∗ satisfies the zero-net supply condition, hence
the constructed θ∗ is an EMPR.
⊲ Uniqueness of the EMPR. Assume that ϑ = (θS, ϑR) is also an EMPR and let (π∗,a,ϑ)a∈A be
the associated Nash equilibrium for which, by definition of EMPR, the zero-net supply condition∑
a π
∗,a,ϑ,2 = 0 is satisfied. Let also (Y˜ a,ϑ, Z˜a,ϑ) be the solution to the minimized-risk BSDE for each
agent a ∈ A. As above, we define (Ŷ w,ϑ, Ẑw,ϑ) :=
∑
a w
a(Y˜ a,ϑ, Z˜a,ϑ) and π̂w,ϑ :=
∑
a c
aπ∗,a,ϑ =
c
∑
a π
∗,a,ϑ. By Lemma 4.8, we obtain that (Ŷ w,ϑ, Ẑw,ϑ) and π̂w,ϑ are optimal for an agent w who
trades in S and B under the given MPR ϑ for a single agent economy. Consequently, using the
characterization between the optimizer and the FOC condition, we have
gwz1
(
t, Ẑw,ϑt − π̂
w,ϑ,1
t σt
)
= −θSt and g
w
z2
(
t, Ẑw,ϑt − π̂
w,ϑ,1
t σt
)
= −ϑRt ,
where π̂w,ϑ,2 = 0 as ϑ is an EMPR. By Lemma 4.7, the first equation guarantees that (Ŷ w,ϑ, Ẑw,ϑ) and
π̂w,ϑ are optimal for an agent with preferences gw who trades in S. By the construction of (Y˜ w, Z˜w)
and π∗,w (for the MPR θ∗), and the uniqueness recalled in Lemma 4.7, we have (Ŷ w,ϑ, Ẑw,ϑ) =
(Y˜ w, Z˜w) and π̂w = π∗,w. As a consequence, we have from the second FOC equation
−ϑRt = g
w
z2
(
t, Ẑw,ϑt − π̂
w,ϑ,1
t σt
)
= gwz2
(
t, Z˜wt − π
∗,w,1
t σt
)
= −θRt .
Hence the uniqueness of the EMPR θ∗.
From Theorem 4.5 we point out that θ∗ is only a MPR for the representative agent’s economy
as the representative agent trades in an incomplete market where she is not able trade the risk
from (Rt) — recall (2.1). Nonetheless, θ∗ is the only MPR leading to a complete market for the
agents where the Nash equilibrium they form satisfies the zero net supply condition. We close this
remark by adding that the representative agent approach for complete market leads to Arrow-
Debreu equilibria for the acting agents (see [HPDR10,KXŽ15] and references therein).
Remark 4.9. In [Rüs13] a “weighted minimal convolution” of risk measures is introduced via
(∧
ρi
)
γ
(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
γiρi(Xi); X1, . . . ,XN ∈ L
p,
N∑
i=1
Xi = X
}
(see page 271, Equation (11.25)) for γ = (γi) ∈ R
N
>0 and for some p ≥ 1.
Observe that aggregation in our context would not work without the dilation weights 1/wa in the
argument of the driver. This can be seen in Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 4.5. The reason is that G˜a is
the sum of ga with the strategies plugged in as arguments and of an additional term with the strategies
multiplied by the weights. For the aggregation as a single strategy this adjustment is necessary.
4.2 A shortcut to the EMPeR in the case of entropic risk measures
In the previous subsection we gave a result on the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
market price of risk via the inf-convolution of the risk measures, for general preferences. In the
particular case of the entropic risk measure, the general computations are considerably simpler and
an easier path allows to compute what the EMPeR θR is (if it exists) without the representative
agent. Although the BSDE for the representative agent derived above will appear in the following
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computations, with only these computations one cannot show that the computed θ is indeed an
EMPR. This shorter path consists, as was hinted in Section 3.3.4, in a direct linear combination of
the BSDEs (3.2) with the minimized driver G˜a given by (3.15).
Following the computations from Section 3.3.5, we see that the market clearing condition re-
quires
0 =
∑
a∈A
π∗,a,2t =
∑
a∈A
1
1 + λ˜a
Z˜a,2t + γaθ
R
t
κRt
⇔ θRt = −
∑
a∈A
Z˜a,2t
(1+λ˜a)∑
a∈A
γa
(1+λ˜a)
= −
∑
a∈A w
aZ˜a,2t
γR
,
if we define γR =
∑
a∈Aw
aγa, with wa = 1/(Λ(1 + λ˜a)) and Λ =
∑
a∈A 1/(1 + λ˜
a). Notice that here
we do not need to normalize the family w = (wa) so that
∑
a∈A w
a = 1, since we are not considering
an aggregated risk measure. Any rescaling Λ′ of w would give the same θR. We present it in this
way for consistency with the general case.
Now, replacing the term θR by the above value in the minimized driver given by (3.15), we find
that the optimal risk processes for each agent solve the BSDEs with driver given by
G˜a(t, Z˜At ) = −
γa
2
(
θSt
)2
− Z˜a,1t θ
S
t +
1
γR
Z˜a,2t
(∑
b∈A
wbZ˜b,2t
)
−
γa
2γ2R
(∑
b∈A
wbZ˜b,2t
)2
. (4.10)
The BSDEs with these drivers form a system of N coupled BSDEs with quadratic growth, which,
in general, are difficult to solve, see [ET15], [Esp10], [FDR11] or more recently [Fre14, KP16].
Fortunately, one can take advantage of the structure of (4.10) and find a simpler BSDE for the
process (Ŷ w, Ẑw) =
∑
a∈A w
a(Y˜ a, Z˜a). It is easily seen that Ŷ wT = −
∑
a∈A w
a(Ha + nHD/N) =
−Hw, as in (4.5). Linearly combining the BSDEs (3.2) with drivers expressed as in (4.10), we find
−dŶ wt =
[
−
γR
2
(
θSt
)2
− Ẑw,1t θ
S
t +
1
2γR
(
Ẑw,2t
)2]
dt− 〈Ẑwt ,dWt〉 with Ŷ
w
T = −H
w. (4.11)
This is exactly the same BSDE as in Example 4.6. Given thatHw and θS are bounded, this BSDE falls
in the standard class of quadratic growth BSDE and the existence and uniqueness of (Ŷ w, Ẑw) is
easily guaranteed. This allows one to compute θR as −Ẑw,2/γR and in turn one can finally solve the
BSDEs giving the minimized risk processes for each agents, using the driver G˜a as given by (3.15).
Remark 4.10 (No trade-off between risk tolerance and performance concern rate). Each agent’s
individual preferences are specified by the parameters γa and λ
a, i.e. risk tolerance and performance
concern respectively. One may ask whether a parametric relation between those parameters exists such
that an agent with (γa, λ
a) and another agent with (γb, λ
b) would exhibit the same behaviour and have
the same optimal strategies. Indeed, in most formulas the two parameters appear as coupled. However,
one can see that the terminal condition Hw is independent of the risk tolerance parameter γ·, hence by
changing λa and γa of any one fixed agent a ∈ A, one cannot obtain the same outcome.
5 Further results on the entropic risk measure case
In this section we investigate further the entropic case. We introduce a structure that allows to
use the theory developed in the previous section and, moreover, to designHD such that Assumption
3.1 holds true. The ultimate goal of this section is to understand how the concern rates λ affect prices
and risks. The first two parts of the section verify that Assumption 3.1 holds and the third sheds
light on the behavior of the aggregated risk and derivative price as the parameters vary.
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We now make further assumptions (commented below) on the structure of the random variables
introduced Section 2. Namely, we assume that the endowments Ha for a ∈ A and the derivative
HD have the form
Ha = ha(ST , RT ) and HD = hD(ST , RT ) (5.1)
for some deterministic functions h·. This structure for the derivative and endowments is interpreted
as each agent receiving a lump sum at maturity time T .
To ease the analysis we will assume throughout a Black-Scholes market (i.e µS , σS are con-
stants). Such an assumption is not strictly necessary for the results we obtain here, but we wish to
focus on the qualitative analysis and not on obfuscating mathematical techniques. Throughout the
rest of this section the next assumption holds.
Assumption 5.1. Let Assumption 2.1 hold. Let σS ∈ (0,∞) and µR, µS ∈ R (and hence also θS ∈ R).
For any a ∈ A the functions hD, ha ∈ C1b (R
2;R) are strictly positive, their derivatives are uniformly
Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. the non-financial risk and satisfy (∂x2h
D)(x1, x2) 6= 0 for any (x1, x2) ∈
R×R.
The assumption concerning the strict positivity of the involved maps or that ∂x2h
D 6= 0 are the
key in proving that Assumption 3.1 is indeed verified for the example we present. The assump-
tion on the form of Ha and HD reduces the BSDE to the Markovian case, giving us access to the
many existing BSDE regularity results, which we will use below in their full scope. It would be
possible (this is left open to future research) to remain in the non-Markovian setting of general
FT -measurable HD and Ha and use link between non-Markovian BSDE and path-dependent PDEs
(see e.g. [EKTZ14]). Indeed, tools on general Malliavin differentiability of BSDE solutions in the
non-Markovian setting can be found in [AIdR10] or in more generality in [DR11,MPR14].
We recall that our goal, in the example below, is to analyze the impact of the parameters λ·, n, γ·
on the risk processes (single and representative agent), derivative price process and EMPeR.
Remark 5.2 (On notation for the section). In this section we work mainly with the representative
agent BSDE (see Example 4.6 or (4.11)) and the derivative price BSDE (3.21).
To avoid a notation overload in what the BSDE for the representative agent is concerned, we drop
the tilde notation and define (Y w, Zw) as the solution to the mentioned BSDE; not to be confused with
(4.3) which plays no role here. The solution to the derivative price BSDE is denoted by (B,κ).
5.1 The aggregated risk
The BSDE (4.11) is not difficult to analyze given the existing literature on BSDEs of quadratic
growth. Recall that θS ∈ S∞ and Y wT ∈ L
∞ (since it is a weighted sum of bounded random vari-
ables). We shortly recall that D1,2 is the space of 1st order Malliavin differentiable processes and D
denotes the Malliavin derivative operator, we point the reader to Appendix A.1 for further Malliavin
calculus references.
Theorem 5.3. The BSDE (4.11) has a unique solution (Y w, Zw) ∈ (S∞ ∩ D1,2) × (HBMO ∩ D1,2).
Moreover, there exists a strictly negative function uw ∈ C0,1([0, T ]× R2,R) such that for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Y wt = u
w(t, St, Rt) and Z
w,2
t = (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)b, P-a.s..
i) For any r, u ∈ [0, t], t ∈ [0, T ] it holds that
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
r Y
w
t P-a.s. and D
WR
u Z
w
t = D
WR
r Z
w
t P⊗ Leb-a.e.
and in particular DW
R
t Yt = Z
w
t P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ].
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ii) There exists a constant C > 0 such that |Zw,2t | ≤ C for any t ∈ [0, T ], i.e. Z
w,2 ∈ S∞ and
∂x2u
w ∈ Cb. Moreover, θ
R ∈ S∞.
iii) The process DW
R
· Z
w belongs to HBMO.
Proof. Let a ∈ A and 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T . Existence and uniqueness of the SDEs (2.1) and (2.2) follow
from Proposition A.3.
By assumption we have Y wT ∈ L
∞ and θS ∈ S∞ which allows to quote Theorem 2.6 in [IDR10]
and hence that (Y w, Zw) ∈ S∞ ×HBMO. Moreover, given that Y wT < 0, a strict comparison principle
for quadratic BSDEs (see e.g. [MY10, Property (5)]) yields easily that Y wt < 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ] and
hence that uw < 0.
Proposition A.3 ensures that the payoffsHD andHa, and henceHw, are Malliavin differentiable
with bounded Malliavin derivatives. Combining this further with θS ∈ R, the Malliavin differentia-
bility of (4.11) follows from Theorem 2.9 in [IDR10]. Under Assumption 5.1 the results in [IDR10]
(or Chapter 4 of [DR11]) along with Theorem 7.6 in [AIdR10] yield the Markov property for Y w
and the parametric differentiability result for the (quadratic) BSDE.
⊲ Proof of i): Since uw ∈ C0,1 by direct application of the Malliavin differential we have for
0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
u
(
uw(t, St, Rt)
)
= (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)(D
WR
u Rt) = (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)b = D
WR
t Y
w
t .
It now follows that DW
R
t Y
w
t = D
WR
u Y
w
t = Z
w
t for any 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T P-a.s..
⊲ Proof of ii): Define now the probability measure Q (equivalent to P) as
dQ
dP
= E
(
−
∫ T
0
〈
(θSs ,−
Zw,2s
γR
),dWs
〉)
. (5.2)
The measure Q is well defined since θS ∈ S∞ and Zw,2 ∈ HBMO. Then for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T we have
(Theorem 2.9 in [IDR10])
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
u Y
w
T +
∫ T
t
[−θSsD
WR
u Z
w,1
s +
1
γR
Zw,2s D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ]ds−
∫ T
t
〈DW
R
u Z
w
s ,dWs〉 (5.3)
⇒ DW
R
u Y
w
t = E
Q[DW
R
u Y
w
T |Ft].
The results in Proposition A.3 and the definition of Y wT imply that |D
WR
u Y
w
t | < C. Path regu-
larity results for BSDEs along with their usual representation formulas (see [IDR10]) yield that
(DW
R
t Yt) = (Z
2
t ) ∈ S
∞; the boundedness of ∂x2u
w follows in an obvious way. As a consequence,
θR ∈ S∞ since Zw,2 ∈ S∞ and (4.9) holds.
⊲ Proof of iii): Using now the fact that θS, Zw,2 ∈ S∞, we apply Theorem 2.6 in [IDR10] to (5.3)
and obtain that DW
R
· Z
w ∈ HBMO. The BMO norm of DW
R
Zw depends only on some real constants
and T , γR, supu ‖D
WR
u Y
w
T ‖L∞ and ‖(θ
S, Zw,2)‖S∞×S∞ (see again Theorem 2.6 in [IDR10]).
In the next result we show that the mapping x2 7→ (∂x2u
w)(t, x1, x2) is Lipschitz. Denote by R
and R˜ the solutions to (2.1) with R0 = r0 and R0 = r˜0 respectively; denote as well by (Y,Z) and
(Y˜ , Z˜) the solutions to BSDE (4.11) for the underlying processes R and R˜ respectively.
Proposition 5.4. For any (t, x1) ∈ [0, T ] × R the map R ∋ x2 7→ (∂x2u
w)(t, x1, x2) is Lipschitz
continuous uniformly in t and x1. In particular the process D
WRZw is P-a.s. bounded.
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Proof. Let 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T and define δDY := DW
R
Y w −DW
R
Y˜ w, δDZi := DW
R
Zw,i −DW
R
Z˜w,i
for i ∈ {1, 2} and (intuitively) δDZ := (δDZ1, δDZ2). Then, following from (5.3) written under Q
from (5.2), we have
δDuYt = δDuYT −
∫ T
t
〈δDuZs,dW
Q
s 〉+
∫ T
t
1
γR
(Zw,2s − Z˜
w,2
s )D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds.
Define now the process
et := exp
{∫ t
0
1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ] with (et) ∈ Hp, ∀p > 1, (5.4)
where the Hp integrability of (et) follows from Lemma A.1. Observe next that by the results of
Theorem 5.3 one has δDuYt = δDtYt = Z
w,2
t − Z˜
w,2
t . Applying Itô’s formula to (etδD·Yt), using the
just mentioned identity and taking Q-conditional expectations it follows at u = t = 0 that
|(∂x2u
w)(0, s0, r0)− (∂x2u
w)(0, s0, r˜0)| =
1
b
|(Zw,20 − Z˜
w,2
0 )| = |
1
b
EQ [eT δD0YT ] | ≤ C|r0 − r˜0|.
The last line is a consequence of Proposition A.3 combined with the fact that EQ[epT ] (∀p > 1) is
finite due to the BMO properties of DW
R
Zw,2, see Lemma A.1. The constant C is independent of
u, r0, r˜0 and s0. AlthoughDW
R
Zw,2 is a BMOmartingale under P, the integrability still carries under
Q; this is the same argument as in the final step of the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [IDR10] (see also
Lemma 2.2 and Remark 2.7 of the cited work).
The extension of the above result to the whole time interval [0, T ] follows via the Markov prop-
erty of the BSDE solution. This relates to the close link between BSDEs of the Markovian type and
certain classes of quasi-linear parabolic PDEs (see e.g. Section 4 in [EPQ97]).
Finally, the boundedness ofDW
R
Zw follows from the Lipschitz property of x2 7→ (∂x2u
w)(·, ·, x2)
and the boundedness of DW
R
R, see Proposition A.3, ii).
5.2 The EMPR and the derivative’s BSDE
We next show that Assumption 5.1 implies Assumption 3.1 holds for the model with entropic risk.
Theorem 5.5 (Market completion). The derivative HD completes the market, i.e. κR 6= 0 P-a.s. for
any t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, κR ∈ S∞ and sgn(κRt ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D) for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Before proving the above result we need an intermediary one. Recall that BSDE (3.21) describes
the dynamics of the price process Bθ, that HD ∈ L∞ and θ ∈ S∞ × (HBMO ∩ D1,2) (following from
Assumption 5.1 and Theorem 5.3).
Proposition 5.6. The pair (B,κ) belongs to (S∞∩D1,2)×(HBMO∩D
1,2) and their Malliavin derivatives
satisfy for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T the dynamics
DW
R
u B
θ
t = D
WR
u H
D −
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u θ
R
s +
〈
θs,D
WR
u κ
θ
s
〉
ds−
∫ T
t
〈DW
R
u κ
θ
s,dWs〉. (5.5)
The representation DW
R
t B
θ
t = κ
R
t holds P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
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Proof. Let 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T . Observe that BSDE (3.21) is a BSDE with a linear driver and a bounded
terminal condition. The existence and uniqueness of a solution follows from the results of [EPQ97].
Moreover, the estimation techniques used in [IDR10] yield that (B,κ) ∈ S∞ ×HBMO (see Theorem
2.6 in [IDR10]). The Malliavin differentiability of (B,κ) follows from Proposition 5.3 in [EPQ97]
and the remark following it since (θS, θR) ∈ R× (S∞ ∩ D1,2) (see Theorem 5.3). The quoted result
and Proposition A.3 yield (5.5) for DW
R
Bθ. Moreover, from Theorem 2.9 in [IDR10] we have
limuրtD
WR
u B
θ
t = κ
R
t for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T P⊗ Leb-a.e..
We now prove a finer result onB and κ, namely thatDW
R
t B
θ
t = κ
R
t holds P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T
instead of just P⊗ Leb-a.e.. This is done by showing that (u, t) 7→ DW
R
u B
θ
t is jointly continuous.
Remark that the map t 7→ DW
R
u B
θ
t for u ≤ t is given by (5.5) and hence it is continuous in time
(∀t ∈ [u, T ]). Note now that Proposition 5.4 and Proposition A.3 yield that DW
R
Zw,2 is bounded
and DW
R
u Z
w,2
t = D
WR
r Z
w,2
t = D
WR
0 Z
w,2
t for any 0 ≤ u, r ≤ t ≤ T . These properties hold as well for
θR via the identity −γRθR = Zw,2.
Using the measure Pθ (introduced in (2.3)), that DW
R
θS = 0 and the identity −γRθR = Zw,2,
one can rewrite (5.5) as
DW
R
u B
θ
t = D
WR
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
〈DW
R
u κ
θ
s,dW
θ
s 〉. (5.6)
Writing the same BSDE as above, but for a parameter v (instead of u) we have
DW
R
v B
θ
t = D
WR
v H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
v Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
〈DW
R
v κ
θ
s,dW
θ
s 〉
= DW
R
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
〈DW
R
v κ
θ
s,dW
θ
s 〉,
where we used the results of Proposition A.3. Since the solution to (5.6) is unique and the BSDE just
above has exactly the same parameters as (5.6), we must conclude that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and for
0 ≤ u, r ≤ t it holds DW
R
u B
θ
t = D
WR
r B
θ
t . From the continuity of t 7→ D
WR
· B
θ
t follows now the joint
continuity of (u, t) 7→ DW
R
u B
θ
t in its time parameters and hence the representation D
WR
t B
θ
t = κ
R
t
holds P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
We can now prove Theorem 5.5.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 5.4. The argument
goes as follows: define the process (et) just like in (5.4); apply Itô’s formula to (etDW
R
· B
θ
t ) and write
the resulting equation under Pθ (just like (5.6)); take Pθ conditional expectations. At this point a
remaining Lebesgue integral is still in the dynamics:
DW
R
u B
θ
t = (et)
−1Eθ
[
eTD
WR
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
es(κ
R
s −D
WR
u B
θ
s )D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds|Ft
]
= (et)
−1Eθ
[
eTD
WR
u H
D|Ft
]
,
where from the first to the second line we used Proposition 5.6, i.e. that κRs = D
WR
s B
θ
s = D
WR
u B
θ
s
P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ u ≤ s ≤ T .
Recalling HD = hD(ST , RT ) and the dynamics of R given by (2.1), we see that (by the chain
rule) DW
R
u H
D = b∂x2h
D. Since b∂x2h
D is either always positive or always negative and since κRt =
DW
R
t B
θ
t P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ], it follows that κ
R 6= 0 P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. More precisely,
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depending on the sign of b∂x2h
D, κR is P-a.s. either always positive or always negative5, giving
sgn(κR· ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D).
5.3 Parameter Analysis
It is possible to justify at a theoretical level some of the predictable behavior of the processes
Y w, Bθ and θR with relation to the problem’s parameters: n, γR, λa and γa for a ∈ A.
Theorem 5.7. Let θ be the EMPR. The process (Y w, Zw) solving BSDE (4.11) is differentiable with
relation to λa for any a ∈ A, n and γR (see (4.4) and (4.6)).
Fix agent a ∈ A. If the differences
γR − γa and E
θ
[(∑
b∈A
wbHb
)
−Ha
]
(5.7)
are positive (negative respectively) then ∂
λ˜a
Y wt is negative (positive respectively) for any t ∈ [0, T ].
For any a ∈ A we have P-a.s that
∂γRY
w
t < 0, ∂γaY
w
t < 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ).
Furthermore, P-a.s
∂nY
w
t < 0, sgn(∂nθ
R
t ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D) ∀t ∈ [0, T ] and ∂nB
θ
t < 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ).
Part of the results are in some way expected. Introducing more derivatives leads to an overall
risk reduction and as more derivatives are placed in the market, the derivative is worth less (per
unit). If γR is interpreted as the representative agent’s risk tolerance, then as γR increases we have
a decrease in risk (Y w decreases) since it represents an increase in the single agents’ risk tolerance
(i.e. γa ր).
The main message of the above theorem is that the effect of the performance concern of one
agent on the aggregate risk depends essentially on how the agent is positioned with respect to
the others, both in terms of risk tolerance as well as the personal endowments. If the agent’s risk
tolerance γa is higher than the aggregate risk tolerance γR and her endowment position dominates
by the aggregate endowment position, then an increase in the agent’s concern rate leads to an
increase of the aggregate risk.
Before proving the above result we remark that condition (5.7) simplifies under certain con-
ditions; such simplifications are summarized in the below corollary. All results follow by direct
manipulation of the involved quantities.
Corollary 5.8. Let the conditions of Theorem 5.7 hold.
If γa = γ for all a ∈ A, then γR − γa = γ
(∑
a w
a − 1
)
= 0.
If N = 2, then wa + wb = 1⇔ wb = 1− wa and hence(∑
c∈A
wcHc
)
−Ha = −wb(Ha −Hb) and
(∑
c∈A
wcHc
)
−Hb = wa(Ha −Hb).
Similarly γR − γa = −w
b(γa − γb) and γR − γb = w
a(γa − γb). Moreover, it holds that
sgn
(
∂λaY
w
t
)
= −sgn
(
∂λbY
w
t
)
P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.8)
5For any positive random variable X (X > 0 P-a.s.) one has EP[X|F ] > 0 for any sigma-field F . Since the measure
change is done for a strictly positive density function, the inequality for the new conditional expectation is still strict.
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Proof of Theorem 5.7. Let a ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ]. Theorem 3.1.9 in [DR11] (see also Theorem 2.8 in
[IDR10]) ensures the differentiability of BSDE (4.11) with respect to γR, γa, λa and n.
⊲ The derivative of Y w in γR: Applying ∂γR to BSDE (4.11) and writing it under the probability
measure Q defined in (5.2) yields the dynamics
∂γRY
w
t = 0 +
∫ T
t
[
−
1
2
(θSs )
2 −
1
2γ2R
(
Zw,2s
)2]
ds−
∫ T
t
〈∂γRZ
w
s ,dW
Q
s 〉.
Taking Q-conditional expectations and noticing that the Lebesgue integral term is strictly negative
for any t ∈ [0, T ), we have then ∂γRY
w
t < 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ).
⊲ The derivative of Y w in γa: This case follows from the previous one as γR is defined by (4.4)
and the weights w· (see (4.6)) are independent of γ·.
γR :=
∑
a∈A
waγa implies ∂γaγR = w
a > 0,
and finally ∂γaY
w = ∂γRY
w · ∂γa(γR). The statement follows.
⊲ The derivatives of Y w in λ˜a: We compute only the derivatives with respect to λ˜a in order to
present simplified calculations as λ˜a := λa/(N − 1). Calculating the involved derivatives leads to
∂
λ˜a
1
1 + λ˜a
= −(Λwa)2, ∂
λ˜a
1
Λ
= (wa)2, ∂
λ˜a
wa = (wa)2Λ(wa − 1), ∂
λ˜a
wb = (wa)2Λwb,
∂
λ˜a
γR = ∂λ˜a
∑
b∈A
wbγb = (w
a)2Λ(γR − γa) and ∂λ˜aH
w = (wa)2Λ
((∑
b∈A
wbHb
)
−Ha
)
.
Combining the above results with the BSDE for ∂
λ˜a
Y w under the Q-measure (just as in the previous
two steps) yields
∂
λ˜a
Y wt = −(w
a)2ΛEQ
[((∑
b∈A
wbHb
)
−Ha
)
+ (γR − γa)
∫ T
t
[1
2
(θSs )
2 +
1
2γ2R
(
Zw,2s
)2 ]
ds
∣∣∣Ft].
Since Q is equivalent to P, the statement follows.
⊲ The derivative of Y w in n: Applying ∂n to BSDE (4.11) and writing it under the probability
measure Q defined in (5.2) yields the dynamics
∂nY
w
t = ∂nY
w
T −
∫ T
t
〈∂nZ
w
s ,dW
Q
s 〉 ⇒ ∂nY
w
t = E
Q[∂nY
w
T |Ft] = −
EQ[HD|Ft]
N
∑
a∈A
wa < 0,
where the last sign follows from the definition of Y wT and H
D.
⊲ The derivative of θR in n: The analysis of Zw,2 and hence of θR with respect to n and γR follows
from the analysis of (5.3). Given representation (4.9), applying ∂n to BSDE (5.3) and writing it
under the probability measure Q defined in (5.2) yields the dynamics
∂nD
WR
u Y
w
t = ∂nD
WR
u Y
w
T −
∫ T
t
〈∂nD
WR
u Z
w
s ,dW
Q
s 〉+
∫ T
t
[ 1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ∂nZ
w,2
s
]
ds
⇔ ∂nZ
w,2
t = ∂nD
WR
u Y
w
T −
∫ T
t
〈∂nD
WR
u Z
w
s ,dW
Q
s 〉+
∫ T
t
[ 1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ∂nZ
w,2
s
]
ds
⇔ ∂nZ
w,2
t = (et)
−1EQ
[
eT ∂nD
WR
u Y
w
T |Ft
]
,
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where (et) is as in (5.4) and the argumentation is similar to that back there. Notice now that with
the terminal condition YT = −
∑
a∈A w
a(Ha + nHD/N) we have
∂nD
WR
t Y
w
T = −
1
N
(∑
a∈A
wa
)
DW
R
t H
D = −
1
N
(∑
a∈A
wa
)
b(∂x2h
D)(ST , RT ).
Given Assumption 5.1, we are able to conclude that sgn(Zw,2t ) = −sgn(b∂x2h
D), and hence, from
(4.9) that sgn(∂nθRt ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D).
⊲ The derivative of Bθ in n: We use justifications similar to those used in Proposition 5.6 and
hence we do not give all the details. Recall (3.21), apply the ∂n-operator to the equation and do the
usual change of measure (with Pθ) to obtain
∂nB
θ
t = 0−
∫ T
t
κRs ∂nθ
R
s ds−
∫ T
t
〈∂nκ
θ
s,dW
θ
s 〉 ⇒ ∂nB
θ
t = −E
θ[
∫ T
t
κRs ∂nθ
R
s ds].
By the previous result we have sgn(∂nθRt ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D) and from Theorem 5.5 we have sgn(κRt ) =
sgn(b∂x2h
D). It easily follows that ∂nBθt < 0.
Unfortunately the conditions used above do not allow for similar results on the behavior of, say
γR 7→ θ
R or (γR, n, λ) 7→ Y˜ a. The conditions required for such results are too restrictive to be of any
usefulness. Nonetheless, we will investigate them in Section 6 via numerical simulation.
6 Study of a particular model with two agents
In this section, we investigate a model economy consisting of two agents using entropic risk
measures and having opposed exposures to the external non-financial risk. We give particular atten-
tion to the impact of the relative performance concern rates on the equilibrium related processes.
The model is simple enough to allow extended tractability, when compared with Sections 3, 4 and
5, and nonetheless still sufficiently general as to produce a rich set of results and interpretations. In
particular, we explicitly describe the structure of the equilibrium. Using numerical simulations, we
are able to explore the dependence of individual quantities (such as the optimal portfolios π∗a and
minimized risks Y a0 ) on the various parameters, thus complementing the results in Theorem 5.7.
6.1 The particular model and numerical methodology
We consider a stylized market consisting of two agents. We argue that a larger set of N agents
with certain exposures to the external risk R can be clustered in two groups: those profiting from
the high values of R and those profiting from the low values of R, and we can apply the weighted
aggregation technique used in Section 4 to each group. Our two agents can therefore be thought
of as representative agents for each group. The external risk process is taken to be the temperature
affecting the two agents, who also have access to a stock market.
Temperature and Stock models
We study one period of one month (T = 1) We study one period of T = 1 month where the
temperatures follow an SDE (2.1) with constant coefficients:
Rt = r0 + µ
R t+ bWRt ,
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and for the stock we take a standard Black–Scholes model:
dSt
St
= µSdt+ σSdW St ,
where the coefficients are r0 = 18, µR = 2 and b = 4 for the temperature process, and S0 = 50,
µS = −0.2 and σS = 0.25 (so θS = µS/σS = −0.8) for the stock price process.
Agents’ parameters, endowments and the derivative
Define I(x) := 1pi arctan(x) +
1
2 ∈ [0, 1]. The agents’ endowments, H
a and Hb, are taken to be
Ha = 5 + I
(
2
(
RT − 24
))
· 15,
Hb = 5 + I
(
2
(
16−RT
))
·
(
15 + 5 I
(
ST − 40
))
.
Agent a profits from higher temperatures while agent b profits from lower ones. The derivative has
a payoff HD that does not depend on the stock S, and is given by
HD = I(RT − 20),
so that it allows to transfer purely the external risk. All functions satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 5.1.
Given the agents’ opposite exposures to RT and the design of HD, agent a will act as a seller while
agent b will act as the buyer, thus establishing a viable market for the derivative.
We assume throughout that the total supply of derivative is zero, n = 0, i.e. every unit of
derivative one agent owns is underwritten by the other. The risk tolerance coefficients of the agents
are fixed at γa = γb = 1 unless we are analyzing some behavior with respect to them. Similarly,
unless otherwise specified, the concern rates are fixed to be λa = λb = 0.25 unless we are analyzing
some behavior with respect to them.
The numerical procedure
The simulation of the processes involves a time discretization and Monte Carlo simulations. We
use directly the forward processes’ explicit solutions; all BSDEs are solved numerically. Regarding
their time discretization, we use a standard backward Euler scheme, see [BT04], and we comple-
ment the time-discretization procedure with the control variate technique stated in Section 5.4.2
of [LdRS15]. The approximation of the conditional expectations in the backward induction steps is
done via projection over basis functions, see the Least-Squares Monte Carlo method used in [GT14].
We follow Sections 3 and 4. First, we solve the representative agent’s BSDE (4.11). This yields
via (4.9) the EMPeR process θR. Once this is obtained, we solve the BSDE for the price Bθ of the
derivative, Equation (3.21), obtaining (κS , κR) in the process. Finally, we solve the BSDE (3.23)
with driver (3.15) for each agent a ∈ A and compute the optimal strategies π∗,a = (π∗,a,1, π∗,a,2) via
(3.16) and (3.17). We note that in the case of two agents, the system (3.16) is easily inverted.
All plots below are computed using 200.000 simulated paths along a uniform time-discretization
grid of 20 time-steps, except the plot of Figure 6.1 which uses 30 time-steps.
6.2 Analysis of the behavior in the model
Figure 6.1 shows a realization of the behavior of the agents over the trading period. One can
see that the price of the derivative moves like the temperature, and in particular it is never constant
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(over a time-interval where the temperature has changed). This means that the derivative does
indeed complete the market by providing the agents full exposure to R, or equivalently to WR –
Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Agent b is always long in the derivative and a always short (the latter
following from the former since her position is the opposite of that of b). The fact that both agents
only go short in the stock is due to its decreasing trend (θS < 0) and the fact that the endowments
depend little on S: it is in mainly an optimal investment in the stock that is observed. However
agent b’s endowment is higher for lower stock prices, hence she does not go as short in the stock as
agent a, to hedge this variability.
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Figure 6.1: Sample paths of the several processes. Stock price on the top left; the temperature and
the derivative price on the top right; the investment strategy in the stock on the bottom left and
that in the derivative on the bottom right, for each agent. Here λa = 0.25 and λb = 0.0.
Trading activity
The optimal investment strategies for the derivative were seen in Section 3.3.6 and are given by
π∗,a,2 =
1
1 + λa
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
and π∗,b,2 =
1
1 + λb
Z˜b,2 + γbθ
R
κR
.
The optimal investment strategies in the stock follow easily by inverting A2 from (3.12). This yields π
∗,a,1
π∗,b,1
 =

1
1− λaλb
λa
1− λaλb
λb
1− λaλb
1
1− λaλb


Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
−
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
Z˜b,1 + γbθ
S
σSS
−
Z˜b,2 + γbθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
 .
Remark 6.1 (On the structure of the equilibrium). The structure of the optimal strategy in the stock’s
investment appears clearly in view of the examples treated in Section 3.3. Each agent computes her
strategy as a weighted sum of the way both would compute their strategy as if there was no rela-
tive performance concern (compare with Section 3.3.3), using the weights
(
1
1−λaλb
, λ
a
1−λaλb
)
for a and(
λb
1−λaλb
, 1
1−λaλb
)
for b.
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These weights can be understood from Equation (3.16) with A = {a, b}: each agent’s best response
is to invest in the stock according to her natural strategy plus λi times the strategy played by the other.
Assume now that each agent was initially planning to compute her optimal position using
π(0),i,1 =
Z˜i,1 + γiθ
S
σSS
−
Z˜i,2 + γiθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
, i ∈ {a, b} ,
and that they are shown, in turn, the strategy that the other is about to play, so that they can update
theirs, yielding a sequence of strategies π(1),a,1, π(1),b,1, π(2),a,1, π(2),b,1, π(3),a,1, . . . for each agent (start-
ing with a’s update). Because they both update their strategy according to Equation (3.16), we observe
agent a imitating part of agent b, imitating part of agent a, imitating part of agent b, etc. Summing the
corresponding series, agent a ends up investing according to
∑
n(λ
aλb)n π(0),a,1+λa
∑
n(λ
aλb)nπ(0),b,1,
and similarly for b.
The structure of the optimal investment in the derivative is much different, following fundamentally
from the endogenous trading condition. If an agent is shown the strategy that the other had decided to
follow, she could not unilaterally change her strategy. From this emerges the EMPeR θR – see below.
We now look at the behavior of the individual portfolios with respect to the rates of relative
performance concern. The intensity of the trading activity at time t = 0 on both the stock (π∗,a,10 )
and the derivative (π∗,a,20 ) as maps of the concern rates λ
a, λb can be found in Figure 6.2. The
positions of agent b are similar in some sense: for the stock, the surface looks very similar; for the
derivative, it is the exact opposite (due to the zero net supply condition). For readability we plot
only the position of agent a.
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Figure 6.2: Initial number πa,10 and π
a,2
0 of shares of stock (left) and derivative (right) held by agent
a, as a function of (λa, λb). For visualization purposes the axes on the left picture were inverted.
The observed behavior in Figure 6.2 is in line with the intuitive idea that the more the agents
are concerned (high λi) with their relative performance V iT − V
j
T , j 6= i ∈ {a, b} (recall (1.1)), the
more they will invest in a way that neutralizes this source of risk. This is done by adopting a trading
strategy that is as close as possible to that of the other agent.
For the stock, we see from the formulas in Remark 6.1 that when λaλb < 1, the process of a
imitating b imitating a, etc, results in a finite position. But the volume increases with both λa and λb,
and explodes as (λa, λb)→ (1, 1). In our example they would both (short-)sell infinitely many shares
of the stock. Note that this is possible only because the stock is assumed to be exogenously priced
and perfectly liquid. For the derivative, they cannot imitate each other and position themselves
in the same direction, as the zero net supply condition implies that the agents must hold exactly
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opposite positions. Agent b’s gains on trading the derivative will be exactly agent a’s losses. The
only way to reduce the difference in performances for a very concerned agent is to engage less (in
volume) in the trading of the derivative. The market clearing condition then forces the other agent
to also trade less (in volume). This is seen from the factor 1/(1 + λi) in the formulas in Remark 6.1
and is confirmed in Figure 6.2 (on the right) where agent a, identified as the seller, ends up selling
fewer units of the derivative as either concern rate increases. Due to the market clearing condition
between the agents, no explosion is possible.
Price of the derivative
Figure 6.3 shows an opposite dependence of the derivative’s priceBθ0 on the concern rates λ
a, λb,
a behavior not captured by Theorem 5.7. One can make sense of this effect by having in mind Figure
6.2. A higher λa implies that agent a wants to trade less and, as she is the seller, this drives the price
up. Symmetrically, a higher λb implies that agent b wants to trade less and, as she is the buyer, this
drives the price down.
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Aggregated risk
Figure 6.4 confirms the analytical results of Theorem 5.7. First note that γa = γb = 1 and so
condition (5.7) simplifies (see Corollary 5.8). As predicted, the increase of the risk tolerances lead
to a decrease in the aggregated risk (see Figure 6.4, left picture). The picture on the right shows
clearly the cross behavior stated in (5.8).
Risk of each agent
Theorem 5.7 does not capture the behavior of each agent’s risk assessment as a function of the
concern rates λ·. Figure 6.5 portrays the risk perceptions of each agent as λa, λb change. Agent
a’s risk Y a0 increases in λ
b and decreases in λa. A possible explanation for the latter behavior (Y a0
decreases with λa) from the perspective of, say a, and having (1.1) or (2.7) in mind is as follows.
If a gives more importance to her relative performance concern then she weighs the term V aT − V
b
T
more than the hedging of the random endowment or the optimization of the personal performance
and trades in a way that mimics more of what b does. The net result of this seems to be the ability
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Figure 6.5: Risk Y a0 (left) and Y
b
0 (right) as a function of (λ
a, λb).
to neutralize more of the performance risk (as a fluctuation around the mean) and less ability
to neutralize the endowment risk. The former apparently carries more weight as Y a0 does indeed
decrease with λa.
The explanation of the first behavior (Y a0 increases with λ
b) seems more direct. As λb increases,
agent b engages in less trading of the derivative in order to reduce her relative performance concern,
and this affects agents a, in particular her ability to hedge Ha.
6.3 Effect of introducing the derivative
We now comment on the effects of introducing the derivative in this model market. Figure 6.6
displays the risks of the representative agent and of agent a with respect to λa and λb when no
derivative is available and when a market for it is available.
We observe in the plot on the right that adding the derivative does not change the aggregated
risk. This is clear if one views it as the risk of the representative agent: being alone by construction,
the zero net supply condition means that she must keep a zero position in the derivative, and hence
does not benefit from its presence (compare the agent of Section 3.3.2 with Example 4.6).
For an individual agent however (left plot), the availability of the derivative always leads to a
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surface), as a function of the concern rates (λa, λb). Right: same plot for the aggregated risk Y w0
(the two surfaces are equal).
reduction of risk. We observe that in the absence of the derivative, the risk of agent a does not
depend on the concern rates. We can apply the methodology of Sections 3 and 4 to find that the
optimal porfolios of the agents in this situation are given by
π∗,i,1t =
1
1− λaλb
γiθ
S + Z˜i,1t
σSSt
+
λi
1− λaλb
γjθ
S + Z˜j,1t
σSSt
for j 6= i ∈ {a, b},
while the minimized risk equation is given by the BSDE
dY˜ it = −
[
−
1
2
γi
(
θS
)2
− Z˜i,1t θ
S +
1
2γi
(
Z˜i,2
)2]
dt+ 〈Z˜it ,dWt〉 with Y˜
i
T = −H
i(ST , RT ).
This shows analytically that the value of the problem, Y a0 , depends on neither λ
a nor λb while the
optimal strategy does, as was already observed in Proposition 4.1 in [FDR11].
Playing the game repeatedly leads to disaster.
The above study considers a one-period model with (continuous-time) trading until the horizon
T = 1month. Imagine now the repetition of this trading period over time and assume no significant
changes to the agents’ endowments or the dynamics of the financial and external risks.
At the level of the agents’ preferences, with the sole exception of the concern rates, they do not
change with time. Specifically, we assume that their risk tolerances, and consequently the entropic
risk measures ρ·0 used to assess their risk in (1.1), are fixed throughout; however, their concern rates
λ· over their relative performance may vary. This can account for some herding or other behavioral
mechanism: after each period, each agent can review the results of everyone’s performance, carry
this information into the next period and update their concern rate accordingly.
Figure 6.5 sheds some light on the outcome of playing this game repeatedly. Indeed, each agent
benefits from a unilateral increase of their concern rate λ while they are worse off with an increase
in the other’s concern rate. So they have an incentive to increase λ, as the trading periods are
repeated, culminating in Assumption 2.3 being violated as (λa, λb)→ (1, 1).
It is interesting to note that this drifting toward the singularity of the model, (λa, λb) = (1, 1),
is not captured by the risk assessments. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show that Y w0 , Y
a
0 and Y
b
0 remain
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bounded. At the level of the investment strategies, the trading activity in the derivative slows down
but persists. The sharing of the external risk becomes less efficient, because the agents are increas-
ingly concerned about losing out to the other, but does not disappear. However, the investment in
the stock explodes (see Figure 6.2). We stress that this behavior arises only after the derivative is
introduced in the market. Indeed, as shown by Figure 6.6, when the derivative is not available and
the agents in A are only concerned with the relative performance of their strategy over the market,
they have no incentive to having increasingly high concern rates. The particular shape of the surface
(λa, λb) 7→ Y i0 , risk decreasing with λ
i but increasing with λj , appears only when the derivative is
made available. In this situation, the agents are placed in direct interaction (by trading) in addition
to the indirect one (social): each agent makes now gains directly over the other. The final result is a
potential destabilization of the stock market.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we analyzed the effect of a form of social interaction between agents on an equi-
librium pricing mechanism. Specifically, we considered the pricing of a (market-completing) deriva-
tive introduced to allow market participants to share the risk associated with an external and non-
tradable risk factor. The social interaction here takes the form of concerns over relative performance.
From a theoretical point of view, we have shown how to solve the problem for general risk mea-
sures and a finite number of agents, when assuming that the derivative completes the market. This
involves solving a coupled system of quadratic BSDEs. Due to the heterogeneous rates of concerns of
the agents, the risks of the agents cannot be aggregated by the usual infimal convolution technique,
so we developed it further and introduced the weighted-dilated infimal convolution variant.
We then focused on the particular case of the entropic risk measure and were able to determine
sufficient conditions to design a derivative that completes the market. In a market model with two
agents representing opposite profiles of exposure to the external risk, we explored the impact of the
social interactions on the benefit brought by financial innovation.
We found that the introduction of the derivative always reduces the risk, at the level of indi-
vidual agents. However, the particular distribution of this risk reduction means that both agents
have an incentive to become more concerned with their relative performance. At the global level,
while this merely decreases the volume of derivatives exchanged, this leads to an explosion of the
volumes traded in the previously-existing financial asset. In practice, the assumption that the agents
are small and that the price dynamics of the stock is independent of their actions fails to hold. Thus,
although the stock price is fundamentally independent of the external risk, introducing the deriva-
tive can lead to unintended consequences on what was a stable stock market. We stress that this
phenomenon is not captured by the risk measures. Therefore one should not only use the perfor-
mance of the risk measure when evaluating the possible benefits of a new policy (the introduction
of the derivative, here). This also stresses the importance of having a systemic view: studying the
problem from the point of view of an individual investor shows that the availability of the derivative
is always beneficial, but at the global level the picture has strong nuances. Strongly undesirable en-
dogenous phenomena can emerge in the dynamics, arising essentially from the interaction between
the various agents and their possibility to adapt to the new policy.
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A Stochastic analysis: notation, spaces and base results
Spaces & Notations
We define the following spaces for p > 1, q ≥ 1, n,m, d, k ∈ N: C0,n([0, T ]×Rd,Rk) is the space
of continuous functions endowed with the ‖·‖∞-norm that are n-times continuously differentiable in
the spatial variable; C0,nb contains all bounded functions of C
0,n; the first superscript 0 is dropped for
functions independent of time; Lp(Ft,Rd), t ∈ [0, T ], is the space of d-dimensional Ft-measurable
random variables X with norm ‖X‖Lp = E[ |X|p]1/p < ∞; L∞ refers to the subset of essentially
bounded random variables; Sp([0, T ] × Rd) is the space of d-dimensional measurable F-adapted
processes Y satisfying ‖Y ‖Sp = E[supt∈[0,T ] |Yt|
p]1/p < ∞; S∞ refers to the subset of Sp(Rd) of
essentially bounded processes;Hp([0, T ]×Rd) is the space of d-dimensional measurable F-adapted
processes Z satisfying ‖Z‖Hp = E[
( ∫ T
0 |Zs|
2ds
)p/2
]1/p <∞; For a probability measure Q, we denote
HBMO(Q) as the space of processes Z ∈ Hp(Q) for any p ≥ 2 such that for some constantKBMO > 0
sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
∥∥EQ[ ∫ T
τ
|Zs|
2ds
∣∣Fτ ]∥∥∞ ≤ KBMO <∞,
where T[0,T ] is the set of all stopping times τ ∈ [0, T ]. As an easy consequence, if Z ∈ HBMO(Q), then∫
HdZ ∈ HBMO(Q) for any bounded adapted process H. Processes in HBMO have very convenient
properties. For the reference measure P we write directly HBMO instead of HBMO(P) .
For more information on BMO spaces and their relation with BSDEs see Section 2.3 in [IDR10]
or Section 10.1 in [Tou13]; we state, for reference’s sake, some of them in the next result.
Lemma A.1. Let Z ∈ HBMO and define Φ· :=
∫ ·
0 ZsdWs. Then we have:
1) The stochastic exponential E(ΦT ) is uniformly integrable.
2) There exists a number r > 1 such that E(ΦT ) ∈ L
r. This property follows from the Reverse
Hölder inequality. The maximal r with this property can be expressed explicitly in terms of the
BMO norm of Φ·. There exists as well an upper bound for ‖E(ΦT )‖
r
Lr depending only on T , r and
the BMO norm of Φ.
A.1 Basics of Malliavin’s calculus
We briefly introduce the main notation of the stochastic calculus of variations also known as
Malliavin’s calculus. For more details, we refer the reader to [Nua06], for its application to BSDEs
we refer to [Imk08]. Let S be the space of random variables of the form
ξ = F
(
(
∫ T
0
h1,is dW
1
s )1≤i≤n, · · · , (
∫ T
0
hd,is dW
d
s )1≤i≤n
)
,
where F ∈ C∞b (R
n×d), h1, · · · , hn ∈ L2([0, T ];Rd), n ∈ N. To simplify notation, assume that all hj
are written as row vectors. For ξ ∈ S, we define D = (D1, · · · ,Dd) : S → L2(Ω× [0, T ])d by
Diθξ =
n∑
j=1
∂F
∂xi,j
(∫ T
0
h1tdWt, . . . ,
∫ T
0
hnt dWt
)
hi,jθ , 0 ≤ θ ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
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and for k ∈ N its k-fold iteration by D(k) = (Di1 · · ·Dik)1≤i1,··· ,ik≤d. For k ∈ N, p ≥ 1 let D
k,p be the
closure of S with respect to the norm
‖ξ‖pk,p= E
[
‖ξ‖pLp +
k∑
i=1
‖|D(k)]ξ|‖p
(Hp)i
]
.
D(k) is a closed linear operator on the space Dk,p. Observe that if ξ ∈ D1,2 is Ft-measurable, then
Dθξ = 0 for θ ∈ (t, T ]. Further denote Dk,∞ = ∩p>1Dk,p. We also need Malliavin calculus for Rm-
valued smooth stochastic processes. For k ∈ N, p ≥ 1, denote by Lk,p(Rm) the set of Rm-valued
progressively measurable processes u = (u1, · · · , um) on [0, T ] ×Ω such that
i) for Lebesgue-a.a. t ∈ [0, T ], u(t, ·) ∈ (Dk,p)m;
ii) [0, T ] × Ω ∋ (t, ω) 7→ D(k)u(t, ω) ∈ (L2([0, T ]1+k))d×n admits a progressively measurable
version;
iii) ‖u‖pk,p= ‖u‖
p
Hp +
∑k
i=1 ‖D
iu ‖p
(Hp)1+i
<∞.
Note that Jensen’s inequality gives6 for all p ≥ 2
E
[(∫ T
0
∫ T
0
|DuXt|
2dudt
)p
2
]
≤ T p/2−1
∫ T
0
‖DuX‖
p
Hpdu.
We recall a result from [Imk08] concerning the rule for the Malliavin differentiation of Itô integrals
which is of use in applications of Malliavin’s calculus to stochastic analysis.
Theorem A.2 (Theorem 2.3.4 in [Imk08]). Let (Xt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ H2 be an adapted process and define
Mt :=
∫ t
0 XrdWr for t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, X ∈ L
1,2 if and only if Mt ∈ D
1,2 for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, for any 0 ≤ s, t ≤ T we have DsMt = Xs1{s≤t}(s) + 1{s≤t}(s)
∫ t
s DsXrdWr.
A.2 Basic Malliavin calculus results for SDEs
With relation to the Brownian motions WR and W S, we denote the Malliavin differential oper-
ators DW
R
and DW
S
, see Appendix A.1.
Proposition A.3. Let Assumption 5.1 hold. Then SDEs (2.1) and (2.2) have a unique solution R,S ∈
Sp for any p ≥ 2 and
i) R,S ∈ D1,2. We have DW
S
u Rt = D
WR
u St = 0 for any t, u ∈ [0, T ] as well as
DW
R
u Rt = 1{u≤t}b and D
WS
u St = 1{u≤t}σ
SSt, t, u ∈ [0, T ]; (A.1)
ii) For any jointly measurable function ψ : [0, T ] × R × R → R that is Lipschitz (in the second space
variable), it holds that
DW
R
u
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
= DW
R
r
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
∀u, r ∈ [0, t], t ∈ [0, T ]. (A.2)
Furthermore,
(
DW
R
0
(
ψ(·, S·, R·)
))
∈ S∞.
6The reason behind this last inequality is that within the BSDE framework the usual tools to obtain a priori estimates
yield with much difficulty the LHS while with relative ease the RHS.
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iii) HD,Ha ∈ L1,2 ∩ S∞ for any a ∈ A (recall (5.1)) and there exists M > 0 for any 0 ≤ r, u ≤ T
and any ζ ∈ A ∪ {D} such that DW
R
u H
ζ = DW
R
r H
ζ and 0 < |DW
R
· H
ζ | ≤M .
iv) Let ζ ∈ A ∪ {D} and let r0 ∈ R. The mapping r0 7→ (D
WR
u H
ζ) is Lipschitz continuous uniformly
in u ∈ [0, T ] for any s0 ∈ (0,+∞).
Proof. Throughout let ζ ∈ A ∪ {D}. General results on SDEs follow from e.g. Section 2 in [IDR10],
standard Malliavin calculus, the fact that S is a Geometric Brownian motion and µR ∈ C([0, T ],R).
Proof of i) The identity DW
S
u Rt = D
WR
u St = 0 is trivial.
Proof of ii) We prove (A.2): assume ψ to be differentiable, then for u, r ∈ [0, t]
DW
R
u
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
= (∂x2ψ)(t, St, Rt)b = D
WR
r
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
,
where we used (A.1). Now a standard approximation by mollification delivers the two results.
Proof of iii) The form of the FT -measurable payoffs HD,Ha is quite specific and it is clear that
for 0 ≤ u ≤ T and ζ ∈ A ∪ {D}
DW
R
u H
ζ = DW
R
u
(
hζ(ST , RT )
)
=
〈
(∇hζ)(ST , RT ), (0,1{u≤T}b)
〉
= b(∂x2h
ζ)(ST , RT ) (A.3)
The boundedness of DW
R
· H
ζ follows from the uniform boundedness of the derivatives of hζ ∈ C2b .
We can then conclude that if ∂x2h
ζ 6= 0 then it follows that DW
R
· H
ζ 6= 0 and, moreover, the identity
DW
R
u H
ζ = DW
R
r H
ζ follows from (A.2).
Proof of iv) We now close with the proof of the last statement. Take s0 ∈ (0,+∞) and let
r0, r˜0 ∈ R be two initial conditions for R (see (2.1)) and we denote the corresponding SDE solutions
R and R˜ respectively. We also denote Hζ and H˜ζ the random variables depending on R and R˜
respectively. Due to the linear form of (2.1) it is immediate that Rt − R˜t = r0 − r˜0 for any t ∈ [0, T ].
The properties of |DW
R
u H
ζ −DW
R
u H˜
ζ | follow from those of ∂x2h
ζ and (A.3). By assumption hζ
is twice continuously differentiable (in space) with bounded derivatives, hence, for some K ≥ 0∣∣(∂x2hζ)(ST , RT )− (∂x2hζ)(ST , R˜T )∣∣ ≤ K|RT − R˜T | = K|r0 − r˜0|.
It follows that for some constant C ≥ 0 independent of the data u, s0, r0 and r˜0 one has, as required,
|DW
R
u H
ζ −DW
R
u H˜
ζ | ≤ C|r0 − r˜0|.
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